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This thesis consists of three essays on the discussion about superiority among different 
government security issuance mechanisms: book-building, discriminatory auctions, and 
uniform auctions. Using a large Chinese government primary and secondary bond 
market data set, I analyse the revenue rankings of these mechanisms. Results suggest 
that uniform auctions are superior to book building and discriminatory auctions in 
generating revenues. Further, results suggest that uniform auctions are better in 
mitigating bond losses compared to discriminatory auctions. 
The first essay compares the primary rate between book building and uniform auctions, 
using data from Chinese local government bonds. Results show that book building 
procedures lead to a higher primary rate than uniform auction procedures, which 
reduces the issuers' revenue. These findings are robust across different revenue 
measurements: primary rates, primary rates normalized by T-bond daily yield rate one 
day prior to issuance day and primary rates normalized by five days' average T-bond 
daily yield rate before issuance day. Therefore, uniform auctions generate higher 
income than book building. 
The second essay exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese 
Government bond issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-
to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or 
discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury 
securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, the study finds 
that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. 
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Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms 
of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different 
bond-yield rate measurements and participation behaviour. 
The third essay documents the existence of primary dealers' losses in Treasury bond 
markets and investigates how these losses affect dealers' market value. Using a novel 
data set that tracks more than 2,350 primary-to-secondary transactions, the study finds 
that bond losses for primary dealers are prevalent and were severe during the financial 
crisis. Results indicate that liquidity constraints are a major source of bond losses 
observed in primary-to-secondary trades. Results also find that financial sector value is 
correlated with these losses. Using an alternating market experiment, the study shows 
that bond losses are higher under discriminatory auctions as compared to uniform 
auctions. 
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1.1 Importance of bond issuing mechanisms 
Bond is an instrument for government and corporation to borrow money from public. 
Although stock market are commonly known by people, the size of bond markets are 
larger than stock market. According to report of Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, the total value of US bond issuance size in 2019 is 8.17 trillion 
dollars while stock issuance size is 228 billion dollars. At the meanwhile, government 
bond markets, the largest security market, carry a big weight in national economy. In 
most countries with market economies, they usually use treasury as a very important 
macro-economic tool to adjust domestic economy and raise money for national 
development. Additionally, the circumstances of government bond markets affect the 
stabilization of whole financial markets. Governments can obtain more revenue and 
remain financial market stable by choosing a proper issuing mechanisms. 
Auctions and book building are two main sales techniques used as issuing mechanisms 
in the equity and security markets. Existing literature discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of each, to discover a superior technique. Three different auction formats 
are also considered in the existing literature: discriminatory auctions, hybrid auctions 
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and uniform auctions since researchers were also interested in which auction format is 
better. 
1.2 Objectives of this thesis 
As mentioned earlier, it is importance for bond issuers to select an appropriate issuance 
technique. This thesis considers the superiority between different issuing mechanisms. 
In Chapter 2, Chinese local government bond data is used to compare the revenue 
generation between uniform auctions and book building. In Chapter 3, the revenue 
difference between discriminatory auctions and uniform auction is considered. To do 
this, data are looked at from a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese 
government policy bond issuers (the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import 
Bank of China). Furthermore, Chapter 4 investigates the existence of bond loss and the 
possible source of bond losses. In addition, this study attempts to explore the correlation 
between the bond loss and instability of financial markets. Eventually, auction 
experiment data from two policy banks are used to compare differences in bond losses 
under uniform auctions and discriminatory auctions in this chapter. 
1.3 Results of this study 
Book building mechanisms were originally designed for Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
markets. Previous literature has focused on comparing under-price levels between book 
building and auctions, using IPO settings. This is because IPO market issuers tend to 
focus on how to promote their shares. Under the IPO setting, many researchers claim 
that book building is better overall compared to uniform auctions. Reasons for this cover 
many areas, including long term relationship between underwriters and their investors, 
level of analyst coverage, classifying investors into high-quality and low-quality, and 
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information disclosure. However, previous research agrees that auctions generate more 
revenue than book building, for issuers in the IPO markets. In contrast to IPO market 
settings, bond market issuers tend to focus on revenue, because financing is a critical 
goal for bond issuers. 
Chinese local government have used both uniform auctions and book building to issue 
their bonds since 2015. This study differs from others, as it uses bond market data to 
compare revenue generation between book building and auctions. In Chapter 2, three 
different revenue measurements are used: primary rate, primary rate normalized by T-
bond yield one day before bond issuing day, and primary rate normalized by five-day 
average T-bond yield before bond issuing day. The OLS approach and Heckman 
approach are used to estimate the empirical model. Results show that book building 
leads to a higher primary rate, which lowers the bond issuers' revenue. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, work is conducted with Klenio Barbosa, Dakshina G. De Silva and 
Hisayuki Yoshimoto, to analyse the Chinese bond auctions from two perspectives: 
revenue and bond losses. 
Governments who issues bonds are interested in knowing which auction format could 
generate the most revenue. This is because their goal is to create finances in order to 
support national projects. In Chapter 3, revenue superiority between uniform auctions 
and discriminatory auctions is examined, using data during the experimental period 
from 2012 to 2015. Previous literature focuses on understanding which multi-unit 
auction format could acquire a lower yield rate, and therefore a higher price for bond 
issuers. However, Ausubel (2008) found that the revenue ranking between uniform 
auctions and discriminatory auctions is ambiguous. This seminal paper has encouraged 
empirical researchers to further study the differences in auction formats. The empirical 
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analysis in this paper is conducted using two different approaches: comparing the 
outcome yield between the two auction formats directly, and comparing the outcome 
yield normalized by the prior day's government-announced corresponding yield across 
the two auction formats. In both approaches, results show that auction yield rates are 
not statistically different between uniform and discriminatory auction formats. 
Furthermore, the estimates suggest that there is no significant revenue difference 
between the two auction mechanisms. 
As there is no revenue difference between uniform auctions and discriminatory auctions, 
differences in bond losses among auction types are examined (shown in Chapter 4). 
Bond losses are also a concern for policy makers, since it will lead to the instability of 
financial markets. 
Recent studies show that the trading of bonds is a major part of banks' activities, and 
accounts for a significant share of their revenues. Losses in the bond market can 
therefore have significant consequences for banks, and for the stability of the banking 
sector as a whole. One way of incurring losses is through participation in Treasury bond 
markets, where financial institutions buy securities in primary market auctions, and sell 
them in the secondary market. 
Chapter 4 first investigates the existence of bond loss in the bond market, using a unique 
Chinese bond market dataset.1 Margins are defined as the gap between the primary 
market and secondary market return rate, after controlling for bond and market 
characteristics. Negative margins are found for about 20% of the observed transactions, 
again even after adjusting for bond and market characteristics. This result shows that 
                                               
1 Data is obtained from Wind database and Chinabond.com.cn 
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primary dealers' losses are prevalent in Treasury bond markets. Additionally, the results 
indicate a correlation between the bond losses and financial recession. During the 
financial crisis from 2008 to 2009, more than 50% of post-auction Treasury transactions 
led to losses. 
Next, the possible mechanisms behind bond losses are considered. Basing on Reuters's 
claim, it is hypothesized that, when facing high borrowing costs, primary market dealers 
are willing to liquidate their on-the-run bonds at a loss, in order to minimize their 
financial distress. To test this possible explanation for bond market losses, this study 
examines whether a change in REPO rate (the best indicator of general liquidity in the 
Chinese market) can predict bond losses. Furthermore, the volume of secondary market 
trades when the REPO rate is high is investigated. The volume of bond trades is 
expected to be higher when primary market dealers face high borrowing costs, as they 
can generate cash using bond sales. To examine these two hypotheses, a simple probit 
regression and OLS regressions are used. 
Furthermore, after documenting the existence of bond losses and their liquidity channels, 
this study considers whether bond losses can lead to financial market instability. We 
select the 10th bottom of distribution and delete all dates including both positive and 
negative margins. FTSE indexes are chosen as the indicators of Chinese bond market 
health. Finally, the difference estimation is used to examine how bond loss affects the 
stability of the financial market. The results confirm that bond loss negatively affects 
the stability of the Chines financial market. 
As bond losses can lead to financial market instability, governments could reduce the 
risk of bond loss by selecting a proper auction mechanism. Data are examined from a 
randomized experiment by two Chinese government bond issuers: CDB and EIB. 
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Results show that uniform auctions could reduce bond losses and therefore help to 
stabilize the financial sector. 
1.4 Importance of this thesis 
This thesis provides three important empirical evidences to policy makers. The first 
study, entitled "Revenue Comparison between Book Building and Uniform auctions", 
indicates that uniform auction performs better than book building on revenue collection. 
According to results from the first study, policy makers should adopt uniform auctions 
if they want to obtain more revenue, comparing to book-building. The second essay, 
named "Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese 
Experiment", finds that there is no statistical difference between uniform auctions and 
discriminatory auctions from the revenue perspective. In the following study, "Bond 
Losses and Systemic Risk", results show that uniform auctions can reduce bond loss, 
stabilizing financial markets, comparing to discriminatory auctions. These threes 
evidences recommend bond issuers and policy makers select uniform auctions as 
issuance mechanisms in bond markets. 
1.5 Organization of this thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2, entitled "Revenue Comparison between 
Book Building and Uniform auctions", compares the revenue between book building 
and uniform auctions. Chapter 3 presents the second study: "Auction Mechanisms and 
Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment". This study analyses the 
revenue superiority between discriminatory auctions and uniform auctions. The third 
essay, "Bond Losses and Systemic Risk", are presented in Chapter 4. It explores the 
prevalence of bond losses and its major forming mechanisms, then considers which 
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auction mechanism can best reduce bond losses. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the 







Revenue Comparison between Book 
Building and Uniform Auctions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Auction and book building are two main sales procedures, which are commonly used 
in equity and security markets. There is a growing body of literature that recognises the 
importance of studying on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative selling 
mechanisms, since firms or bond issuers have to pay unnecessary issuing cost when 
they choose an improper issuing mechanism (Kutsuna and Smith, 2003; Pettway et al., 
2008). However, there is no clear conclusion regarding the revenue ranking superiority 
between auction and book building formats. Hence, in this study, I utilize a unique 
dataset from Chinese local governments that use both uniform auction and book 
building designs, to sell government securities to study which mechanisms is better in 
revenue generation. 
In the previous literature, the question regarding superiority between auctions and book 
buildings exists due to many countries introduced both mechanisms into the same 
market, especially the IPO market. Therefore, most of the past research on the 
comparisons between auction and book building mechanisms have concentrated on the 
IPO market. Further, bond markets rarely introduce both auctions and book buildings 
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as the issuing mechanisms. The majority of literature claim that book building performs 
better than uniform auctions in the IPO market from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective, though book building will lead to higher initial rate and under-pricing. 
In his theoretical paper, Sherman (2000) claims that the main advantage of book 
building is the long-term stable relationship between the underwriters and their 
investors as it is beneficial for improving the under-pricing in the IPO market. Further, 
Jovanovic and Szentes (2007) demonstrate that book building can disclose more 
information to distinguish between high-quality investors and low-quality investors; the 
auction cannot accomplish this and can lead to adverse selection in the market. 
Meanwhile, many empirical studies support the advantage of book building on 
information disclosure and long-term relationships between the underwriters and 
investors. Pettway et al. (2008), using the Japanese IPO data, point out that analyst 
coverage is higher in the book building than in the uniform auction. Additionally, 
Kutsuna and Smith (2000, 2003) compare auctions and book buildings in the Japanese 
IPO market. They show that the uniform auction method leads to adverse selection in 
the Japanese IPO market. Also, they mention that the level of under-pricing varies with 
the scale of issuers, even though the under-pricing is significantly higher in the book 
building than in the auction on average. They find that under-pricing improves when 
the issuer is a large company. Furthermore, they argue that researchers should consider 
the opportunity cost of the underinvestment and loss because of the inaccurate pricing 
in uniform auctions when they compare the auction and book building. In addition, Ma 
and Faff (2007) claim that, in the Chinese IPO market, book building is better than the 
uniform auction format, especially in low return and high volatility markets. 
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Moreover, studies on both the European and US markets also prove the superiority of 
book building from the information revealing aspect compared to uniform auctions. 
Degeorge et al. (2007), using French IPO data of 1991, observe that the coverage of 
favorable research is higher in book buildings than in auctions and that higher analyst 
coverage can provide more confidence to the lead underwriter promoting the company. 
After studying the US IPO market, Degeorge et. al. (2010) agree that the reason why 
underwriters prefer book building is due to the long-term relationship. Meanwhile, they 
point out that failed auctions are excluded in their study, leading to a bias in their results 
when they investigate the under-pricing and price between uniform auction and book-
building. 
Apart from the research in specific countries, Sherman (2001) and Jagannathan et al. 
(2015) list countries using auctions and book buildings. From these global evidences, 
they summarise that the auction method is driven out by book building in IPO markets 
because auction needs more sophistication bidders. From their perspective, auctions are 
designed for the large scale companies, which is the key reason that auctions can 
succeed in the government bond. In addition, Anand (2005) traces the IPO transaction 
data from a specific company, Google, highlighting that book buildings perform better 
than auctions. 
Although the major view supports book building in IPO markets, most studies cannot 
deny that auctions can reduce under-pricing, especially for the small size companies. 
From the information dimension, Derrien and Womack (2003) suggest that the auction 
offering incorporates more information about the current and recent past market 
condition than the book building offering. Furthermore, Pukthuanthong et al. (2007) use 
11 pair of strictly matching companies in US IPO market to compare the price discovery, 
11 
 
one of advantages of book building, between the uniform auction and book building. 
They note the conclusion of superiority on price disclosure between auctions and book 
building is ambiguous due to the long-run under-performing in book building scenarios. 
Moreover, auctions have advantages over book building on lowering underwriter spread 
and increasing turnover in the secondary market. 
Therefore, there is no clear conclusion regarding the revenue generation ranking 
between auction and book building formats. Further, as previously mentioned, the 
comparison between the auction and book building focuses on the IPO market due to 
the lack of book building examples and relevant data in bond markets. My study is the 
first which use bond market data to investigate revenue superiority between uniform 
auctions and book building. 
The Chinese central government added the book building format to sale mechanisms 
for issuing the local government bonds beginning in 2015, providing me a good 
opportunity to study the superiority between uniform auctions and book buildings. In 
this study, I compare the primary rate and two different normalized primary rates 
between auctions and book building by using the data gathered on Chinese local 
government bonds from 2015 to 2019. My results show that book building leads to a 
higher primary rate than uniform auctions, reducing the bond issuers' revenue. My 
results are consistent with Kaneko and Pettway (2003). 
This study is organized with the following structure. In section 2.2, I introduce the 
market background about Chinese local government bond, including the history of 
Chinese local government bonds, issuing procedures and issuers of local government 
bonds and the construction of T-bond daily yields. In section 2.3, I show the data 
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description: data source and statistical summary. In the fourth section, I display my 
main estimations and robustness checks. Finally, section 2.5 provides the conclusion. 
2.2 Market Background 
This section will first describe the development of Chinese local government bonds, 
and introduce the two issuing procedures (book building and uniform auctions). Next, 
the issuers of local government bonds will be described. Finally, the yield curve daily 
data (used for normalizing the bond-level yield rates) will be discussed. 
2.2.1 The development of Chinese local government bonds 
Before 2009 local governments were prohibited from issuing bonds unless required by 
law or the State Council (The Budget Law of the People's Republic of China, 1994).2 
The 1994 tax reform consolidated more than half of the national tax revenue to the 
central government, causing local governments' income to fall sharply. Local 
governments were forced to borrow money from national banks and increase 
administrative fees to cover the fiscal deficit. In 1995, the central government reformed 
national banks' technology and property, to control the non-performing assets, and also 
cancelled more than 20,000 types of administrative fees. This caused local government 
debts to increase significantly. Furthermore, the central government introduced 
expansionary fiscal policies in 2008, which local governments could not abide by due 
to lack of funds. As a result, the central government decided to allow local governments 
to issue their own bonds. The local government bond market began to gradually open 
(Jin et al., 2009). 
                                               
2 the 28th rule in the The Budget Law of the People's Republic of China 
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In 2009, the Chinese Minister of Finance (MOF), began to issue and payback local 
government bonds.3 Initially, local governments could not issue bonds independently, 
and bonds shared the sovereign credit rating. In 2011, the State Council approved 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Shenzhen as pilot provinces to issue bonds 
independently. In 2013 and 2014, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Jiangxi, and Ningxia 
were added to the list of pilot provinces. The central government finally decided to 
allow all local governments to issue bonds independently in 2015 (Li and Qian, 2017; 
Shen and Cao, 2010). 
Alongside the opening of the local government bond market, the issuing and trading 
volume of local government bonds increased significantly between 2009 to 2018 
(Figure 2.1). As shown in Figure 2.1, since 2014 there has been a steep rise in the annual 
issuing and trading volumes, reflecting when the central government opened local 
government bond markets. The issuing and trading volumes continue to rise until it 
peaked in 2016, then it declined slightly. 
2.3 Issuing procedures: book buildings and uniform auctions 
Book building is widely used in both developed countries and emerging markets. It was 
originally designed for the US Initial Public Offering (IPO) issuance in the 1990s and 
is still a popular practice in the IPO market. However, book building is rarely applied 
to bond markets for pricing the bonds of companies (Sherman, 2001). 
Three parties are involved in book building: the issuer, the book manager and a 
syndicate group. In a typical book building scenario, the issuer hires a book manager 
                                               
3 In February 2009, the Chinese MOF claimed, in their official document The Budget Management of 
Local Government Bonds in 2009, that all local government bonds and their issuing fees are issued and 
paid by the Chinese MOF on behalf of local governments 
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(usually a merchant bank) and builds a syndicate group. The book manager announces 
the price band and total supply to the syndicate group, after discussing this with the 
issuer. Next, syndicate group members submit their bids and demand volume, based on 
orders placed by their customers within the time prescribed. The bids and demand 
volume are made in accordance with the price range and supply volume. This process 
builds the price and demand “book”, whereby the book manager obtains the list of 
aggregate demands at each price level. The issuer and book manager set a final price 
based on the demand information in the book, which is usually the weighted average 
price or interest rate. In the final stage, the book manager will allocate shares to winning 
members according to his discretion. 
Uniform auctions, on the other hand, are more popular in bond issuance than IPO 
issuance, and issuers employ different auction techniques to issue their bonds. There 
are three main differences between book building and uniform auctions. First, uniform 
auctions only have two parties: the issuer and the syndicate group. Second, in uniform 
auctions, issuers cannot disclose any demand information before bids are submitted. 
This is due to the absence of book managers. The third difference between book 
building and uniform auctions is the allocation procedure. For example, the winners in 
a bond auction are those who bid higher than the market-clearing price or lower than 
the market-clearing yield rate.4 Afterward, the bond volume that winners receive is the 
sum of their bidding volume at each winning price or yield level. 
Uniform auctions and book building are both used for Chinese local government bonds. 
Since 2009, Uniform auctions were used to issue 73% of bonds, while 27% of the 
                                               
4 The market clearing means that at the price or yield rate that all bonds are sold. They are lowest 
winning price and highest winning yield. 
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securities were issued using book building in the Chinese local government bond market. 
The Chinese MOF has formulated rules for these two issuing mechanisms. 
For local government bonds issued by uniform auctions, the Chinese MOF allows local 
governments to build their own syndicate groups. Potential members need to be 
prequalified by the local MOF, based on their financial capacity, performance and credit 
rating in the last three years. 5  After selecting the syndicate group members, local 
governments announce if they plan to use uniform auctions or book building to issue 
securities. This announcement must be made at least five working days before the 
bond's issuance.6 All details about the upcoming bond auction are announced at least 
one working day before the auction.7 On the auction day, all members in the syndicate 
group submit their bids, and results are released on the same day. The lowest winning 
price is the bond price and the highest winning interest rate is the coupon rate. Following 
the payment rule of uniform auctions, the bond volume that winners are allocated to is 
the sum of their bidding volume at each winning price or yield level. Furthermore, 
winners of auctions pay the bond price or the coupon rate depending on auction tenders 
which are listed in the pre-announced documents.8 
For local government bonds issued by book building, the Chinese MOF gives local 
governments two options regarding the syndicate group; they can either build a new 
syndicate group (with at least four participants) or use the syndicate group used for 
uniform auctions.910 
                                               
5 Local governments create similar pre-qualification rules for selecting members of syndicate groups. 
6 The 11th rule of The Standards of Auction of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
7 The 11th rule of The Standards of Auction of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
8 The 9th and 10th rule of The Standards of Auction of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
9 The 7th rule of Chapter 2 in The Standards of Book Building of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
10 There is no official evidences shows that local governments build independent syndicate groups for 
book building and auctions respectively 
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Like the IPO book building, the book manager is selected from the syndicate group by 
local governments. The book manager collects and records demand prices from each 
syndicate group member. The book manager and other main group members then 
negotiate with the local government, to decide the price (interest rate) range based on 
investors' bidding intention and average T-bond yield rate of five days prior to the bond 
issuing day. All details about the bond issuing (including the price range, book building 
process, principle of price decision, sale rules and issuing system) are released five days 
prior to the bond issuing day. On the bond issuing day, all participants (except the book 
manager) in the syndicate group submit their bids. Local governments collect members' 
demand information and announce the lowest winning price or the highest interest rate. 
Ultimately, the payment process of book building is the same as uniform auctions 
(which differs from IPO book building).1112 
2.3.1 Issuers of local government bond 
In the The Budget Management of Local Government bonds in 2009, the Chinese MOF 
defined the issuers of local government bonds are provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. Since the _rst local government bond issued in 2009, there are 31 
provinces issued their own bonds in ten years. Figure 2.2 shows the total number of 
local government bonds by each issuer since 2009. Notably, most bonds are issued by 
Liaoning, the second most by Shandong, and the least amount by Tibet. 
                                               
11 The Chapter 3 of The Standards of Book Building of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
provides all rules of book building process 




2.3.2 The T-bond daily yield rate data 
The market T-bond yield data is created by the China Central Depository Clearing Co. 
Ltd. (CCDC). The CCDC is a State Council-approved agency (also authorized by the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission) that records all government bond-related 
transactions. The T-bond is a government bond issued by the Chinese MOF. The CCDC 
releases the yield data for different maturities of T-bond on each business day 
(depending on the T-bond transaction data on the same day). 
The market T-bond yield curve is used to normalize the primary market rate, and as a 
proxy for market volatility. Local governments use the average T-bond yield rate for 
five days prior to the bond issuing day as a reference to set the price range. Therefore, 
the yield curve is used to calculate volatility. The volatility measurement is separated 
by different maturities. 
2.4 Data Description 
Data were collected from three sources: the Wind database, Chinabond.com.cn and the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The Wind database is maintained by Wind 
Information. Co. Ltd., who is one of the largest financial data and information providers 
in China. Chinabond.com.cn is the official website of the China Central Depository & 
Clearing Co. Ltd. The National Bureau of Statistics of China is a national agency 
(directly governed by the State Council of China), responsible for collecting, 
investigating and publishing national economic statistics. 
Uniform auction and book building data were collected from the Wind database. This 
data include bond characteristics as such as bond name, maturity, total supply, bond 
type, and tender subjects (price and interest rate). Issuing information (including auction 
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and announcement dates, issuers, and issuing methods) and outcome details (including 
final winning yield, primary rate, and subsidies) were also collected from the Wind 
database. Chinabond.com.cn was used to obtain daily T-bond yield data, monthly 
issuing volumes and trading sizes. Finally, the total annual GDP and population for each 
province were acquired from the Nation Bureau of Statistics of China. This data was 
used to calculate the provincial GDP per capita. 
2.4.1 Summary statistics 
Chinese local governments use both book building and uniform auctions to issue bonds. 
To compare the differences in generated revenue between the two techniques, Chinese 
local government bond data from 2015 to 2018 is analysed. In the sample, only bonds 
with maturity ranging from one to ten years are included. This is because local 
governments only use book building for issuing bonds with maturities in this range. 
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of the sample. Furthermore, the central MOF 
recommends that local governments use book building procedures to issue their bonds 
when the total bond size is small.13 Book building is only used when the total supply 
value is less than 27.65 billion yuan. Hence, bonds valued higher than 27.65 billion 
yuan were not included in the analysis. Therefore, in this study, I initially match 
securities offered using uniform auctions and book building by maturity and volume. 
As shown in Table 2.1, 2,868 local government bonds were issued between 2015 and 
2018. Of these, 2,107 bonds were issued through uniform auctions, and 761 bonds 
through book building. The average primary market rate overall is 3.609. The mean 
primary market rate under uniform auctions is 3.607, which is slightly lower than the 
                                               
13 The 3rd rule in Chapter 1 of The Standards of Book Building of Local Government Bonds' Issuing 
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primary market rate under book building (3.615). The means of other important control 
variables in the empirical model are as follows: T-bond yield one day prior to bond 
issuing day (3.230), maturity (6.259), total supply (41.963), volatility (0.020) and 
monthly aggregated volume of matured bonds (602.218). The unit of total supply and 
monthly aggregated volume of matured bonds is one hundred million. 
2.5 Estimation results 
2.5.1 Main estimation 
To compare the revenue ranking between book building and uniform auction procedures, 
I use the empirical model as follow: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ ∅ + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                                     (2.1) 
The dependent variable, is for a given bond i, issued by the province j in the period t. In 
this study, I employ three different dependent variables in my model: the primary rate, 
the primary rate normalized by T-bond yield one day prior to bond issuing day 
(normalized rate A) and the primary rate normalized by five-day average T-bond yield 
prior to bond issuing day (normalized rate B). The variable D is the dummy variable 
which identifies the issuing mechanism, which equals one when the bond is issued by 
book building, otherwise, it equals zero. The coefficient 𝛽 captures the difference of 
revenue from book building and uniform auction. Also, I control bond characteristics 
and market conditions (X) in my model. The 𝛼 and 𝜏 are province and time effects, and 
𝜀 denote the error term. 
The empirical analysis is conducted using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
Firstly, primary rate is used as the dependent variable, and the results are shown in Table 
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2.2 (columns 1 and 2). Column 1 shows the regression of the primary rate on the 
indicator of book building, t-bond yield one day prior to the bond-issuing day, province 
effects, month effects, and year effects. Yield is controlled for because the central MOF 
recommends local governments and their syndicate groups use the t-bond yield as the 
reference to bid. Therefore, dealers' bids may be affected by the T-bond yield rate. In 
column 2, variables of bond characteristics and market conditions are shown. These 
include maturity, total supply, volatility, and the monthly volume of matured local 
government bonds in the model. 
Next, normalized rate A (the primary rate minus T-bond yield one day prior to the bond 
issuing days) is used as the dependent variable, and the parameters are re-estimated 
using the equation (2.1). The regression results are presented in Table 2.2 (columns 3 
and 4). Using normalized rate A is advantageous, as the unobserved economic factors 
across bonds can be captured (Hortacsu et al., 2018). Column 3 shows the regression of 
normalized rate A on the indicator of book building, province effects and time effects. 
Column 4 shows the regression results when the same variables as in column 2 are 
included in the model. 
In columns 5 and 6, the normalized rate B (the primary rate minus five working days' 
average T-bond yield before the bond issuing days) is used as the dependent variable. 
The Chinese central MOF requires local governments to use the average T-bond daily 
yield for the five days prior to the bond issuing day, as a reference to set the bid range 
for both uniform auctions and book building. Accordingly, the bidding behaviours are 
affected by previously short-run market conditions. Therefore, this analysis uses the 
five days average T-bond yield instead of the one-day T-bond yield rate to remove the 
unobserved heterogeneity of pre-issuance market conditions across the bonds. As 
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before, initially, the simple regression estimate only includes the proxy of book building 
after controlling the province and time effects. Next, all variables of market conditions 
and bond characteristics are controlled for. 
The results in column 1 show that book building procedures lead to higher primary yield 
and lower revenue for bond issuers, compared to uniform auction procedures. This 
result is statistically significant. Column 2 shows that, after controlling other market 
conditions and bond characteristics, the result is consistent with that in column 1. 
Furthermore, columns 3 to 6 use different measurements of local governments' revenue, 
and estimation results are also consistent with the first two regressions. 
The above results are consistent with previous literature regarding the Japanese IPO 
market (Kaneko and Pettway, 2003). The coefficient of the book building dummy 
variable captures the difference in primary rate between uniform auctions and book 
building, ranging from 0.188 to 0.194. Book building bidders are thought to have more 
bargaining power than in uniform auctions, because of the advantage of information 
disclosure in the book building process. This is especially true of sophisticated and 
experienced bidders. Higher analyst and research coverage in the book building process 
can help bidders to price the bond more accurately and bid rationally, leading to fewer 
over-bids (Derrien and Womack, 2003). However, in uniform auctions, participants 
may bid more aggressively, as they only need to pay the market-clearing yield. As a 




Local governments may follow specific rules when they select issuing mechanisms for 
their bonds, which could lead to selection bias in the results.14 
To address this concern, a Heckman model is used. The probability of using book 
building as the issuing mechanism (the selection equation) is specified. All the same 
variables used in the outcome equation (shown in Table 2.2, column 2) are included. In 
this case, there are no exclusion restrictions, so the nonlinearity of the functional form 
of the selection equation is leveraged.15 Results are shown in Table 2.3 (column 1) and 
indicate that selection is not a concern. 
Furthermore, the dependent variable is changed from primary rate, to normalized rate 
A and normalized rate B. The same method is used to re-estimate the Heckman model. 
Results are shown in Table 2.3 (column 2 and 3) and are the same as in the main 
estimation. There is a significant positive correlation between primary rate and book 
building techniques, which shows that book building generates less revenue for local 
governments. 
 2.5.3 Robustness Check 
2.5.3.1 Top provinces versus bottom provinces 
The previous estimations included all provincial issuers in the empirical model. 
However, it could be argued that the revenue ranking results between book building and 
uniform auctions may differ across provinces with varying economic strength. To 
                                               
14 According to the 3rd rule in Chapter 1 of The Standards of Book Building of Local Government 
Bonds' Issuing, the central MOF recommend book building formats to issue small size bonds. 




address this, all Chinese provinces are ranked based on their GDP per capita per year. 
The bonds issued by the annual top five and bottom five provinces between 2015 to 
2018 are analysed; a total of 494 bonds issued by the top five provinces, and 382 bonds 
issued by the bottom five provinces. The empirical model is adjusted for the two groups, 
using the variables given by the main OLS estimations (excluding the province effects). 
The results from these regression estimations are presented in Table 2.4. This further 
supports the conclusion from the main estimations: book building decreases the revenue 
for local government bond issuers. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this study, I investigate the superiority of revenue between book building and uniform 
auctions by using the Chinese local bonds from 2015 to 2018. From the results, I find 
that book building procedures lead to higher primary rate, lowering the revenue for the 
bond issuers, compared to the uniform auctions. 
In previous research, the comparison between the book building and auction 
mechanisms are concentrate on the IPO market. My finding makes an important 
contribution to the field of comparison between book building and auctions by first 
using bond market data. Although Chinese local government bond issuing market and 
Japanese IPO issuing market use different auction formats,16 my results support the 
conclusion from empirical studies about the Japanese IPO market that book building 
brings higher initial rate than auctions (Kaneko and Pettway, 2003; Kutsuna and Smith, 
2003). 
                                               
16 Chinese local government bonds are issued by uniform auctions while Japanese IPO issuance 
employs discriminatory auctions. 
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Although, this research shows that book building procedures will make issuers lose 
money, the Chinese central government still keeps the book building format as one of 
the alternatives for local governments to issue bonds. There are two conjectures about 
this. First, the central government may use the advantage of book building on 
information revealing to avoid the adverse selection in the local bond market, even 
though they need to pay extra cost. Second, according to the rules, the higher return in 
book building for bidders can attract primary bidders to participate in the local 
government primary market, helping local government and book managers promote 
their bonds to the investors. 
This study only focuses on the revenue superiority between book building and auctions 
for the issuers. The main contribution of my study is to provide strong empirical 
evidence, recommending auction formats, to bond issuers when they decide the issuing 
methods from the revenue dimension. From the IPO literature, most researchers have 
focused on the under-pricing, which combined the issuing market and resale market. It 
is worthy to study the problem of under-pricing by using the bond data from the primary 
market and the secondary market. Thus, I leave this advanced topic for future study 









































Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean / Counts 
Number of bonds sold in the primary market 2,868 
Uniform-auction 2,107 
Book-building 761 
Average primary market rate 3.609 
(0.496) 
Average primary market rate under the uniform auction 3.607 
(0.510) 
Average primary market rate under the book building 3.615 
(0.455) 








Monthly matured bond 602.218 
(446.732) 
This table reports the number of total bonds sold in the primary market, the number of 
bonds using uniform auction and the number of bonds using book building. Also, this 
table presents means and standard deviations of average primary market rate, the 
average primary rate under uniform auctions and book building respectively. In addition, 
this table shows the mean and standard deviation of control variables in the empirical 
model, including T-bond yield one day prior to bond issuing day, maturity, total supply, 









Table 2.2: Main estimation 
Variables Primary rate Normalized rate A Normalized rate B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












T-bond Yield one 






    


























Month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 2,868 
R-squared 0.947 0.951 0.595 0.626 0.616 0.643 
This table reports the main OLS estimation results for primary rate, Normalized rate A 
and Normalized B. Normalized rate A is calculated as primary rate minus T-bond yield 
one day prior to bond issuing days. Normalized rate B is calculated as primary rate 
minus five days average T-bond yield before bond issuing days. All columns are 
controlled the indicator of book building, month effects, year effects and province 
effects. Additionally, Column 2 and 3 are controlled T-bond yield one day prior to bond 
issuing day. In Column 2, 4 and Column 6, I control the log of maturity, log of total 
supply, volatility and log of volume of monthly matured bond. 95% confidence intervals 
calculated based on robust standard errors are in brackets, and p-values are denoted by 








Table 2.3: Heckman estimation 
Variables Primary rate Normalized rate A Normalized rate B 
(1) (2) (3) 
Book building 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.192*** 
T-bond Yield one day prior 






























Month effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,868 2,868 2,868 
R-squared 0.951 0.626 0.643 
One potential concern is that local governments may select issuing mechanisms based 
on specific rules. To address this concern, I use Heckman model to correct selection 
bias. I re-estimate three different measurements on the indicator of book building, log 
of maturity, log of total supply, log of monthly matured bond, volatility, month effects, 
year effects and province effects. In addition, the T-bond yield one day prior to bond 
issuing days is controlled in Column 1. The calculation of Normalized A and B is same 
as Table 2.2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 









Table 2.4: Top provinces versus bottom provinces 
Variables Primary rate Normalized rate A Normalized rate B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Top provinces 












T-bond Yield one 






    


























Month and year 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 
R-squared 0.942 0.953 0.596 0.672 0.611 0.664 
Panel B: Bottom provinces 












T-bond Yield one 






    


























Month and year 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 382 
R-squared 0.957 0.964 0.641 0.690 0.661 0.701 
This table reports the estimation of groups of top and bottom provinces, respectively. 
The ranking of provinces is based on their annual per GDP Capita from 2015 to 2018. 
The group of top provinces includes top five bond issuers from each year based on their 
economics strength, while the group of bottom provinces includes bottom five bond 
issuers. Independent variables in Column 1 to Column 6 are same as Column 1 to 
Column 6 in Table 2.2 except the province effects. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, and p-values are denoted by asterisks according to the following scheme: 








Auction Mechanisms and Treasury 




Researchers around the world have long been interested in understanding which multi-
unit auction format generates a lower yield rate and a higher price for bond issuers (Back 
and Zender, 1993; Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993; Goswami et al., 1996; Kremer and 
Nyborg, 2003; Hortacsu and McAdams, 2010; Hortacsu and Kastl, 2011). The debate 
is also of public interest, as a well designed Treasury auction market could potentially 
generate larger revenues and reduce tax burdens. The two auction methods most 
frequently used to sell Treasury Bonds are discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. 
In discriminatory-price auctions, trades occur at different rates indicated in the bids 
while, in uniform-price auctions, all winning bidders obtain the same yield rate, equal 
to the highest winning bid rate.  
Ausubel et al. (2014) in their seminal paper in the theoretical multi-unit auction 
literature, derive general revenue rankings of uniform and discriminatory auctions 
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under several conditions. They find that, by changing model setups, such as bidder-
information symmetry and risk-neutrality assumptions, researchers can derive different 
revenue rankings. An empirical identification of which assumptions in Ausubel et al. 
(2014) hold in multi-unit auctions is, however, a challenging task. Therefore, they 
emphasize that determining the revenue-enhancing pricing rule is an empirical question 
and encourage empirical researchers to further pursue by either direct or counterfactual 
comparison of auction rule outcomes. 
In this study, we exploit an alternating-auction-rule market experiment (hereinafter `the 
experiment') conducted between 2012 and 2015 by two large Chinese government 
banks-the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank (EIB)-to 
investigate the revenue ranking of uniform and discriminatory auctions. 17  The 
experiment lasted for three years and the total value of the experiment was U 1.95 
Trillion (approximately $ 291 Billion). Because the Treasury auction formats are 
alternated in the experiment, the CDB and EIB design their auction formats based 
neither on bond characteristics, nor on financial and economic market conditions. Our 
summary statistics and balance tests confirm that the auction format used by the CDB 
and EIB to sell government bonds was not correlated with observed bond features or 
market conditions. Consequently, the two auction rules were used in an otherwise 
similar environment that allows us to obtain unbiased estimates to assess the effect of a 
specific auction rule on yield rates and revenue of Treasury securities. 
                                               
17 These banks are government policy banks that finance economic policies and the securities issued by 
these institutions are `Chinese government bonds.' These institutions have the same short and long 
credit ratings awarded by Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. Their credit ratings also coincide with 




In the Treasury auction data from the CDB and EIB experiments, we see that the yield 
rates generated from the two auction formats are not statistically different. We also see 
no substantial economic difference between the two auction formats in terms of revenue. 
This study is the first to address this important empirical revenue-comparison question 
by directly comparing the outcomes of those two multi-unit auction rules using real 
market data in a large-scale market-based experiment.18 
Our empirical analysis looks for any difference in the yield rate of securities sold 
through discriminatory and uniform auctions during the experiment. This direct 
empirical comparison of yield rates is important because the theoretical literature is 
inconclusive regarding revenue superiority between the two auction formats.19 As in 
Hortacsu et al. (2018), our outcome is the normalized auction yield rate, constructed as 
the weighted-average auction winning rate minus the prior day's corresponding market 
yield of Chinese bonds based on maturity and institution. 20  Hereafter, this is the 
`normalized rate.' Using the normalized rate is advantageous because the market yield 
curve removes unobserved heterogeneity across auctions as it captures fluctuations of 
the economic environments. Additionally, the same security at different times may 
experience dissimilar demand-side factors and accounting for unobservable 
heterogeneity at the auction level becomes crucial. 
                                               
18 The debate over the revenue comparison is more than a half-century old, originally initiated by Milton 
Friedman (1959 and 1991). Friedman (1991) claims that, by switching from the discriminatory to the 
uniform format, the US Treasury would save 75 basis points. 
19 Bukhchandani and Huang (1989) show that uniform auctions yield higher revenue than discriminatory 
auctions in multi-unit common value Treasury auctions with resale opportunities. Back and Zender (1993) 
show that Treasury's one-shot switch from the discriminatory to the uniform auction format could reduce 
Treasury's revenue. Moreover, under a risk-neutral and symmetric information environment, Wang and 
Zender (2002) show a revenue advantage in discriminatory over uniform auctions. 
20 Simon (1994), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), and Malvey et al. (1998) name the normalized auction 
yield rate as the mark-up. 
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Analysing the market-based experiment, we control for bond characteristics and market 
conditions in all specifications. Results from a control-based estimation approach with 
relevant baseline variables perform better (improve efficiency and increase statistical 
power) and dominate the uncontrolled estimates even when observable characteristics 
in groups (e.g., auction format) are statistically not different (Bruhn and McKenzie, 
2009). 
Our ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results indicate that normalized rates are 
not statistically different between uniform and discriminatory auctions. In our OLS 
results, the point estimates range from 0.001 to 0.008 percent depending on the 
empirical specification. Additionally, we use the Bayesian regression technique in our 
empirical models. Results from Bayesian models indicate that our estimated 
coefficients of the dummy variable that captures the difference in the two auctions range 
from -0.006 to 0.002. 
A series of additional tests ensures that our results are robust. First, we examine whether 
normalized rates differ between the auction formats due to high and low yield rates in 
discriminatory auctions. Second, we investigate whether bidders are potentially aware 
of the alternating-rule auction format during the experiment and behave strategically by 
choosing the most profitable auction mechanism. Third, we investigate whether our 
results hold for the full distributions of normalized rates by re-estimating the empirical 
models using the quantile regression method. Lastly, we look for any differences 
between uniform and discriminatory auction yield rates held by the CDB and EIB 
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individually.21 These additional tests show that our results qualitatively do not change. 
See the details of the robustness tests in the Supplementary Material. 
However, a reader may question whether our point estimates on the difference in the 
normalized rates does correspond to the actual difference in revenues from bond 
issuance in the two auction formats. Therefore, we estimate the change in revenue if the 
CDB and EIB would have issued their bonds in uniform over discriminatory auctions. 
This exercise shows that the potential loss/gain from issuing all bonds through a uniform 
auction ranges from -0.00041 percent (worst case) to 0.00054 percent (best case) of 
Chinese government expenditure during the three-year experiment. These results prove 
that the use of uniform or discriminatory formats does not generate considerable 
economic gain. 
Our research also refers to the recent empirical literature on Treasury auctions. 
Pioneered by Hortacsu (2002), recent studies build and estimate structural Treasury 
auction models and base the evaluation of different auction rules on counterfactual 
simulation (Hortacsu and McAdams, 2010; Hortacsu and Kastl, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the counterfactual results based on structural estimation do not provide clear-cut 
conclusions about which Treasury auction rule generates a lower yield rate and larger 
revenue. Some studies present results favoring uniform auctions, others support 
discriminatory auctions. Another set of studies reports that the two mechanisms would 
generate quantitatively similar revenues.22 In addition, although revenue equivalence is 
                                               
21 Additionally, our results hold even for only non-floating bond auctions-the largest subset of bonds in 
our sample. 
22 The empirical literature presents mixed views on the revenue comparison. Tenorio (1993), Umlauf 
(1993), and Armantier and Sbai (2006) report a revenue advantage in the uniform format, while Simon 
(1994) and Fevrier et al. (2004) support the discriminatory format. However, the most popular _nding 
in the empirical literature|Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996); Malvey et al. (1998); Horta_csu (2002); 
Horta_csu and McAdams (2010); and Bonaldi et al. (2015)-is empirical revenue equivalence with 
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often reported in empirical studies, the ambiguous revenue ranking in the theoretical 
literature (Wang and Zender, 2002; Ausubel et. al., 2014) does not necessarily imply 
revenue equivalence, which warrants careful experimental investigation. 
By analysing the one-shot auction-rule change (i.e., single time-point auction rule 
switching during an investigation period) introduced by the U.S. Treasury in 1973-76 
and 1992-93, other studies have investigated whether the uniform or discriminatory 
format generates a lower yield rate and a higher price (Simon, 1994; Mester, 1995; 
Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996; Malvey and Archibald, 1998).23 However, these studies 
were unable to provide unbiased estimates for the revenue ranking as the bonds issued 
under the two auction formats were different in several dimensions (market conditions, 
maturity, duration, volume, etc.).24 Conversely, the auction format used by the CDB 
and EIB to sell government bonds during the experimental period was not related to 
bond characteristics and market conditions, which allow our OLS and Bayesian 
regressions to provide unbiased estimates for the different in the yield rates of uniform 
and discriminatory auctions. Our findings also complement previous structural 
estimations and counterfactual results. 
Lastly, besides providing evidence of no relevant economic different between the two 
auction formats, the experiment offers us a novel research design. Other Treasuries and 
banks worldwide could replicate it and assess other aspects of auction mechanisms such 
                                               
statistically insignificant differences. Also, Brenner et al. (2009) investigate revealed preferences of 
auction mechanism choices among approximately 50 countries. 
23 Tenorio (1993) and Kang and Puller (2008) also investigate one-shot changes from one auction format 
to another in Zambian foreign exchange and Korean Treasury auctions, respectively. 
24 Using laboratory experimental data, Sade et al. (2006a), Sade et al. (2006b) and Morales Camargo et 
al. (2013) investigate revenue ranking, collusion, bidders' information asymmetry in multi-unit auctions. 
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as the effects of asymmetric bidding behaviour, set-asides, lot-size effect, uncertain 
supply, and tilted supply function with great potential to increase revenues. 
In Section 3.2, we explain the market background and, in Section 3.3, we explain the 
experiment and the data. Section 3.4 presents the auction market. We discuss our results 
in Section 3.5 and, in Section 3.6, we assess the economic difference between the two 
auction formats. The conclusion is presented in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Market background 
In this section, we introduce two government policy-bank bond issuers-the CDB and 
the EIB-which conducted the alternating rule experiment in the People's Republic of 
China (henceforth, PRC). We then present the identical credit ratings of these two 
institutions. Lastly, we explain the yield curve of each institution's securities, publicly 
announced every business day. 
3.2.1 Two government security issuers (CDB and EIB) 
The CDB issues bonds to finance government-initiated national development projects 
(domestic and foreign), while the EIB auctions off_ bonds to raise funds for projects 
related to exports and high-tech industries. Barbosa et al. (2020) provide a detailed 
explanation of the historical background of these two institutions. 
3.2.2 Credit ratings 
The CDB's and EIB's short- and long-term ratings are listed in Table 3.A.1 in the 
supplementary material. The credit ratings are awarded by three foreign agencies: 
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. This table also lists the ratings of government 
securities issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a benchmark reference. All 
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institutions have homogeneous credit ratings within each year indicating that, as per the 
rating agencies, all government securities are categorized equivalently. 
The credit ratings of these government banks are homogenous because their bonds are 
administrated by the People's Bank of China (Chen, 2014). Further, bond market 
participants perceive that bonds issued by these institutions are fully backed by the 
Chinese government (Chen, 2010; Li, 2014). 25  26 Thus, the CDB and EIB have 
historically had the same credit ratings, enabling us to compare auction outcomes across 
institutions. Finally, although institutional credit ratings were awarded to these bond-
issuing institutions, each government security has no credit rating. These institutions do 
not appear to have solicited credit analyses from rating agencies prior to 2017. 
3.2.3 Yield curves 
We use the market yield curve to normalize the bond-level auction yield rates and 
control for market volatility. The market yield data are obtained from the China Central 
Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd. (CCDC), a State Council-approved agency (also 
authorized by the China Banking Regulatory Commission) that records all government 
bond-related transactions.27 
Based on previous resale market transactions, the CCDC publicly announces the yield 
curves for securities issued by each institution and maturity on every business day. 
                                               
25 The People's Bank of China (the central bank), which governs the CDB and EIB, operates directly 
under the government. Additionally, the MOF operates directly under the State Council. 
26 See Chen (2014) for political-economic background on the CDB and EIB, indicating that they have 
Chinese government-guaranteed sovereign credit ratings. Also see Chen (2010), and Li (2014) for details 
on credit rating equivalence. 
27 The secondary market for government bonds in China is quite substantial, with nearly 14 trillion USD 
in bonds traded on a yearly basis. 
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These yield curves provide official benchmarks to general investors.28 29Moreover, 
resale market yield rates, especially for short-term bonds, experience significant 
volatility and convey information about market conditions. Hence, in our regression 
analyses, we use the variance of the yield curve in the period from five business days 
before the auction date to control for the volatility in the Chinese bond market.30 
3.3 The experiment 
For the periods May 2012-July 2014 and July 2013-May 2015, the CDB and EIB 
alternated between discriminatory and uniform pricing auction formats. The CDB held 
their weekly (or bi-weekly) auctions on Tuesdays, while the EIB typically held their bi-
weekly (often less frequent) auctions on Fridays. In any auction, both institutions 
usually held multiple auctions with bonds of varying maturities.31  During these market-
based experiment periods, the institutions controlled the auction formats (alternating 
between them) but the experiment was not publicly announced. Most importantly, the 
auction rule choices made by the CDB and EIB cannot conceivably be correlated with 
the observed and unobserved bond characteristics or with financial market variables in 
our regression models. As we show in Section 3.5, observable bond characteristics and 
financial and economic market conditions are not correlated with the auction format. 
                                               
28 No other benchmark yield curves are publicly announced in China 
29 The CCDC constructs the official yield curve mainly using settlement prices of government bonds in 
the inter-bank market. When they are unavailable, the CCDC uses bilateral quotes in the inter-bank 
market, bilateral quotes in the OTC market, transaction prices in the exchange market, quotes and final 
prices in fixed income platform of the exchange market, quotes of money broking corporations, and the 
estimated value of yield rate from market members. 
30 The variance is separately derived for each institution by the corresponding maturity. 
31 For instance, on April 8th, 2014, the CDB auctioned o_ four types of securities-with one-, two-, three-, 
five-, and seven-year maturities-through separate auctions. 
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3.3.1 CDB experiment 
During the experiment, the CDB held a total of 269 auctions. Out of these, 139 were 
uniform and 130 were discriminatory. Within each (bi-) week, the CDB auctioned off 
bonds of different maturities (two-, three-, five-, and seven-year) with varying auction 
rules.32 Table 3.A.2, Panel A presents a stylized pattern of this experiment. The auction 
mechanism alternated between discriminatory and uniform auction rules (see 
discriminatory auctions on 22 January 2013 and uniform auctions on 29 January 2013). 
Additionally, for some weeks, the CDB set the discriminatory format for three- and 
seven-year maturity notes, and the uniform format for five-year notes. However, in the 
following (bi-) week, all maturities were sold through the uniform auction format. 
3.3.2 EIB experiment 
Similarly, the EIB also experimented with their security auction rules. From July 2013 
to May 2015, the EIB held 79 auctions|49 using the uniform format and 30 using the 
discriminatory format. Although the alternating auction-rule pattern is not as stylized as 
that used by the CDB due to fewer and relatively infrequent auctions, the pattern of the 
EIB's auction rule experiment is as follows. The EIB conducted bi-weekly (often less 
frequent) auctions, held typically on Fridays. The EIB alternated the two different 
auction rules for different maturities (see Table 3.A.2, Panel B.1) and, in the latter half 
of the experimental period, the EIB used both auction rules for bonds of the same type 
when reissuing them (see Table 3.A.2, Panel B.2).33 
                                               
32 In addition to the two-, three-, five- and seven-year notes, the CDB also auctioned off one year bills 
and ten-year notes. These were always sold through the uniform-pricing format. Hence, one-year and 10-
year securities are excluded from our regression analyses. 
33 When reissued, each bond received a new ID. As we know the old bond ID, we can identify the reissue 
of an old bond. 
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3.3.3 The timing of auction-rule announcements 
During the experimental period of 2012-2015, the CDB and EIB were required to follow 
strict security issuance guidelines set by the People's Bank of China. 34Accordingly, the 
CDB and EIB made auction-rule announcements three business days in advance. So the 
participants knew which format was going to be used for a given auction only three 
business days before the auction date. To illustrate what was known by auction 
participants at the auction, consider the following example. Suppose that auctions are 
held every Tuesday and we consider two auctions in two consecutive weeks. Once the 
first auction's transactions are settled, the outcome of the auction is made public on 
Wednesday. Then, institutions announce the specific details of the second auction (e.g. 
auction date, volume, mechanism, corresponding maturity, etc.) on Thursday.3536Hence, 
ex-ante, bidders did not know the specific date, volume, and maturity of upcoming 
auctions nor associated future auction formats. Hence, based on the time of the 
announcement, bidders could not condition their current bids on future auction rules.37 
3.4 Auction market data 
We obtain data on Treasury auctions in the Chinese bond market from two data sources, 
the Wind Database and Chinabond.com.cn. The Wind Database is maintained by the 
Wind Information Co. Ltd., a financial data and information provider in China. 
Chinabond.com.cn is the official website of the China Central Depository & Clearing 
                                               
34 Source: Official Notice of People's Bank of China (2009). These guidelines explicitly state that the 
public notice of a new issuance auction has to be made at least three business days in advance. 
35A small number of deviations from these stylized announcement patterns were made when there was a 
long interval between two consecutive auction dates or in the event of a public holiday. 
36 Specifically, the CDB made a public announcement of the auction rule on a Thursday and bids were 
submitted on the Tuesday of the following week. The EIB made a public announcement typically on a 
Tuesday and bids were submitted on the Friday of the same week. 
37 Our data confirm that the CDB and EIB followed the guidelines set by the People's Bank of China. 
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Co. Ltd., which is the only government bond depository authorized by the MOF and is 
responsible for the establishment and operation of the government bond depository 
system. 
The Wind Database provides access to the details of the CDB and EIB bond auctions. 
Our data contain not only the information of auctioned bonds, such as maturity, auction 
method, size of auction, and tender subjects (e.g., price or yield), but also the auction 
outcomes of weighted-average winning yield rate (or price), total demand, number of 
bidders, number of bids, number of winning bids, number of winners, final coupon rate 
for each auction, the presence or absence of floating coupons, as well as the highest and 
the lowest winning rate in discriminatory auctions. We collect supplementary 
information from Chinabond.com such as bond types, subsidies, coupon payment, and 
the date of each bond issued by the CDB and EIB. 
Our data provide information at the auction-level. Bid-level data with the identity of 
bidders are not available due to the restrictive nature of Chinese bond market data. 
Nevertheless, the data generated from the experiment contain information on Treasury 
security yield rates for the two auction formats that is used to directly answer the long-
standing revenue-ranking question in the literature. The definitions of the variables used 
in this study are in Table 3.A.3 in the supplementary material. 
3.4.1 Auction rules and market conditions 
A potential concern about our empirical strategy would be the possible correlation 
between auction formats, bond features, and market conditions. If a specific auction rule 
is endogenously chosen when the financial market experiences a specific circumstance, 
then our estimates would be biased despite using experimental data. There are three 
important reasons why the auction formats are not correlated to unobserved bond and 
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market characteristics. First, under the (bi-) weekly alternating nature of the auction 
rules, as well as the strictly regulated timing of the auction announcements, it is not 
plausible that the unobserved bond characteristics, nor present and future financial and 
economic market conditions, have room to influence the auction rule. Second, 
systematic changes in financial market conditions do not normally occur on a (bi-) 
weekly basis. Lastly, during the experimental period of the EIB (described above) two 
auction rules were used within the same week. Also, note that the differenced 
construction of the normalized yields prevents unobserved characteristics from entering 
into our regression models. 
We find statistical evidence that the respective auction rules are not associated with any 
specific bond type, nor are they chosen to match specific financial conditions. Table 3.1 
reports summary statistics for observables associated with uniform and discriminatory 
auctions. In this table, we show the mean of the prior day's yield curve, the maturity of 
the auctioned security, market volatility, and the value of maturing bonds by institution 
for a given month. Similarly to Park and Reinganum (1986) and Ogden (1987), we 
include an indicator variable that captures whether the auction date takes place seven 
days before or seven days after the end of the month. This control variable captures 
large financial transactions concentrated at the end of the month, as financial institutions 
prefer to keep a relatively large liquidity at that time. In Table 3.1, we also provide 95 
percent confidence intervals and calculated t-values. The results show that these 
variables are not statistically different between uniform and discriminatory auctions, 
indicating that bond characteristics and financial market conditions were well-balanced 
during the experiment. For example, the average market yield rate of Chinese bonds 
one day before the auction date is 3.685 percent for uniform auctions, while it is 3.683 
percent for discriminatory auctions. The 95 percent confidence intervals clearly overlap 
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between uniform and discriminatory auctions and the calculated t-value is 0.044. 
Similar conclusions are derived for other variables presented in Table 3.1. These results 
hold for 95 percent confidence intervals as well.38 
3.4.2 Auction rules and number of bidders 
Another concern is the equality of the number of bidders in these two auction formats 
during the experiment. It is worth noting that, to bid in the primary market, bidders have 
to be prequalified. Primary market bidders have to go through a rigorous 
prequalification process and past performance influences the continuation as a primary 
dealer in the following year. On average, during the experimental period, the CDB had 
about 76 pre-qualified bidders while the EIB had about 66. Additionally, we observe 
that more than 90 percent of dealers continue from year to year during the experiment 
period at each institution. Considering new entrants, the CDB and EIB had, respectively, 
about six and five new entrants every year during this period. More importantly, on 
average, about 88 percent of primary dealers participate in the auctions of both 
institutions. We observe a similar pattern for the pre- and post-experimental period. 
More detailed information can be found in Barbosa et al. (2020). However, the CDB 
and EIB enforce neither mandatory participation nor purchasing volume requirement. 
Hence, we examine bidders' participation behavior during the experiment period. In this 
case, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜑 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                                    (3.1) 
                                               
38 In addition to the t-test, we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to evaluate the equality of 




where our dependent variable is the number of bidders in an auction i sold by an 
institution j at a given time t. The indicator variable, D, controls for the auction 
mechanism (D = 1 for discriminatory auctions). Other observable characteristics, such 
as time gap between auctions by institution, demand-to-supply ratio of bonds, duration 
of the bond sold, and market conditions, are represented by the vector X. Institution 
effects and time effects are denoted by 𝛼 and 𝜏 respectively and µ is the error term. 
Given that the number of bidders is a count, we estimate Equation (3.1) using the 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method.39 We also estimate the above 
model using OLS. Table 3.A.4 in the Supplementary Material reports these results with 
and without floating bonds. Our main interest is in the coefficient of the auction 
mechanism dummy. Our results show that there is no statistical difference in the number 
of bidders based on auction rule during the experimental period. 
Hence, conditional on controls, this experimental environment enables us to 
conceivably interpret the auction rule variable as conditional mean-independent, 
treating it as exogenously assigned. Taken all together, the Treasury auction 
experimental environment in China is quite advantageous to directly comparing the 
revenues generated from uniform and discriminatory auctions. In the next section, we 
conduct our empirical analysis by investigating whether there is any difference in the 
yield rate of the CDB and EIB securities sold through discriminatory and uniform 
auctions. 
                                               
39 For PPML estimation, the only condition required for consistency is the correct specification of the 




3.5 Estimation results 
To assess the revenue ranking of uniform and discriminatory auctions, we consider the 
following empirical model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ ∅ + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡,                          (3.2)  
where our dependent variable, y, is the normalized yield rate for a given auction i, from 
institution j, in period t. The variable D is a dummy variable which identifies the auction 
mechanism as described before. The coefficient 𝛽  identifies the difference in 
normalized rates generated from uniform and discriminatory auctions. We also include 
other controls (X) as described before. The error term is denoted by 𝜖 while 𝛼 and 𝜏 are 
institution and time effects. 
We estimate the parameters in Equation (3.2) using two different estimation methods. 
First, we conduct our empirical analysis using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
approach. Second, we use a Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) technique based on 
a hybrid Metropolis-Hastings sampling scheme with Gibbs updates to estimate our 
posterior mean and posterior standard deviations of the parameters in Equation (3.2). 
OLS results are presented in the first three columns of Table 3.2, while Bayesian results 
are presented in the last three columns. 
In all our Bayesian regressions, we use uniform priors for the regression coefficients 
and an inverse-gamma prior with shape and scale parameters of 0.1 for the error 
variance. Further, we implement 22,500 iterations and the first 2,500 are omitted to 
mitigate possible start-up effects.40 This Bayesian approach offers several considerable 
                                               
40 Gelman et al. (2004) provide a detailed description of the Bayesian method, including conditional 
distributions and the uniform prior distributions used in this study. 
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advantages. First, the MCMC gives us the finite-sample properties of the resulting 
estimates rather than asymptotic approximations. Second, incorporating a non-
parametric unobserved heterogeneity component makes the specification of the model 
more flexible and, hence, the results more robust (Li and Zheng, 2009). However, in 
practice, one must verify the convergence of MCMC before making any inferential 
conclusions about the obtained results. In our exercise, we see that the posterior 
distribution looks normal. The kernel density estimates based on the first and second 
halves of the sample are very similar to each other and are close to the overall density 
estimate. Both approaches provide an unbiased and consistent estimate for β when 
auction rule variable D is exogenously determined, as in our case. 
In our base model, presented in Column 1 of Table 3.2, we regress the normalized yield 
rate on a parsimonious model with an indicator for discriminatory auctions, floating 
bonds, monthly effects, year effects, and market drift term. Controlling for monthly and 
year effects are suitable because the government objectives or budgets could change 
yearly and/or the promotion of high-tech industries may vary by season. For example, 
it is quite common to promote new television in November or December than in July or 
August. Given the well-balanced experiment conducted by the CDB and EIB, described 
in Section 3.4, the estimations from this simple OLS regression provide unbiased 
estimates. Our estimated coefficient from this regression indicates that normalized 
winning rates for uniform and discriminatory auctions are statistically not different and 
are close to zero. This shows that our results on the statistical indifference of the yield 
rate between the two auction mechanisms hold even without controlling for additional 
observable auction characteristics and market conditions. 
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Exploiting a market-based experiment, in our other specifications we control for bond 
characteristics and market conditions to examine the auction-rule effect. As Bruhn and 
McKenzie (2009) have pointed out, in such non-laboratory experiments, a control-based 
estimation approach with relevant baseline variables improves efficiency, increases 
statistical power, and dominates the uncontrolled estimates even when observable 
characteristics in groups (e.g., discriminatory vs. uniform auctions) are not statistically 
different. 
Hence, in Column 2 of Table 3.2, we include additional controls for auction and 
financial market conditions. Specifically, we do so in Column 2 and in all subsequent 
models (excluding Column 4) as we pool the observations from the CDB and EIB 
auctions. We also include bond-issuer fixed effects to account for any difference 
between bonds of different issuers that goes beyond their credit risk. In Columns 3 and 
6, we include the number of bidders in addition to other controls. Overall, our results 
indicate that there is no statistical difference between uniform and discriminatory 
auctions' normalized yield rates. From our estimations in Table 3.2, the coefficients of 
the discriminatory auction dummy are close to zero. They vary from -0.006 percent (-
0.6 bps) to 0.008 percent (0.8 bps), which corresponds to -0.001 percent and 0.002 
percent of the mean auction rate of the bonds in our sample (the mean auction rate is 
4.394 percent, i.e., 439.4 bps). In general, regardless of the estimation method, our 
results indicate that the estimated yield rate difference generated between uniform and 
discriminatory auctions is close to zero and has no statistical significance. 
3.6 Assessing economic difference 
In the previous section, we have shown that the normalized yield rates are not 
statistically different across the two auction formats. However, the point estimates are 
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not perfectly equal to zero and the large monetary value involved in Treasury auctions 
raise questions about the exact size of the revenue gap created by the different auction 
formats. Thus, we investigate whether the bond issuers would experience any 
economically relevant change in revenue if they switched from one auction format to 
the other. 
We use the point-estimates of the difference in the normalized rates reported by the 
discriminatory auction dummy, β, in Table 3.2 to calculate the change in CDB and EIB 
revenue if they issued their bonds using a uniform auction rather than a discriminatory 
one. We then compute the percentage change in the total revenue and the total change 
in the revenue with respect to Chinese government expenditure during the three years 
of the experiment (2013-2015) for each column. 
For each institution, we first derive its total bond revenue by calculating the summation 
of all bonds that were auctioned off using uniform or discriminatory auctions. Next, we 
compute the total revenue if all bonds were sold through uniform auctions by replacing 
the price (𝑝𝑖) of each bond issued by discriminatory auctions with its counterfactual 
price (𝑝𝑖
𝑐), which is its equivalent price if that bond was auctioned off through a uniform 
format. Accordingly, the counterfactual total revenue, 𝑇𝑅𝑐is then given by: 
𝑇𝑅𝑐 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑐𝑞𝑖
𝑖∈𝑑𝑎𝑖∈𝑢𝑎
                                               (3.3) 
where 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖are the observed prices and quantities for each bond in auction i, and ua 
and da respectively refer to the subsets of bonds which were auctioned off using 
uniform or discriminatory mechanisms. 
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To obtain 𝑇𝑅𝑐, we need to compute 𝑝𝑖
𝑐using the estimated difference in the normalized 
rates, β, reported in Table 3.2. Adopting fixed-income pricing theory to our setting, we 
can write the  𝑝𝑖









(1 + 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 − 𝛽)𝑚
,     (3.4) 
where m is the number of coupon periods of the bond (i.e., its maturity), k is the 
periodical coupon rate payment on the maturity value V, yield is the period market yield 
rate, and spread is the margin over the market yield curve for a bond issued in a 
discriminatory auction.41 For the CDB and EIB, the maturity value, V, of every bond is 
equal to 100 RMB. Note that, at the time of issuance, the yield + spread corresponds to 
the coupon rate, which makes the issue price of each bond equal to 100 RMB. To 
compute the counterfactual price 𝑝𝑖
𝑐, we calculate the present value of the expected cash 
ow by subtracting the estimated β from the spread. 
Now, with p𝑖
𝑐 computed from Equation (3.4), we can use Equation (3.3) to obtain the 
change in total revenue. In Table 3.3, we present the results from this exercise. The first 
row shows the estimated difference in the normalized rates, β, reported in Table 3.2. In 
the second and third rows in each column, we respectively report the percentage change 
in the total revenue and the total change in revenue with respect to Chinese government 
expenditure during the three years of the experiment. 
The results in Table 3.3 reveal that the percentage change in the total revenue, if the 
bond issuers have issued all their bonds using a uniform auction, ranges from -0.012 
                                               
41 For example, see Fabozzi (2015). 
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percent to 0.016 percent at the mean. Further, the potential loss or gain from issuing all 
the EIB and CDB bonds through a uniform auction ranges from -0.00041 percent (worst 
case) to 0.00054 percent (best case) of the Chinese government expenditure during the 
three years of the experiment, which is negligible. We have provided upper and lower 
bounds (at 95 percent confidence intervals) of these revenue changes in parentheses. 
They range from a worst case of approximately -0.006% to a best case of +0.007%. 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have exploited a large auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government 
Treasury security issuers-the CDB and the EIB-to investigate whether treasury 
securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. We 
find that outcome yield rates for both formats are not statistically different. These 
estimates also indicate that there is no relevant economic difference in terms of revenue 
between the two mechanisms. Further, our results suggest that bidders do not reveal any 
preference for any one format. 
Our observed empirical results are connected to preceding influential works as recent 
developments in the structural Treasury auction literature provide insightful views on 
market design. For instance, Hortacsu and McAdams (2010) report that, in their 
counterfactual simulation of Turkish Treasury auctions, switching from the 
discriminatory to the uniform format does not significantly increase revenue. Their 
result is similar to our finding. In addition, Bonaldi, Hortacsu, and Song (2015) report 
that, in the Federal Reserve's Mortgage-Backed Security auctions, there is a “negligible” 
revenue difference between the discriminatory format and truthful bidding uniform 
price auction (which works as a benchmark in their study) with mixed directions of 
revenue change when they counterfactually simulate each auction. Our direct 
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comparison with alternating auction rules complements these prominent counterfactual 
studies by adding market-based experimental support| empirically, there is no 
substantive economic difference in revenue between uniform and discriminatory 
auctions. 
Although the Chinese experiment enables us to directly compare auction outcomes and 
provide inferences on which Treasury auction rule generates a lower yield rate (larger 
revenues), our study has some limitations. Specifically, the lack of bid-level data with 
information about bidder identity prevents us from studying some aspects of market 
design-asymmetric bidding behaviour with heterogeneous costs, informational 
advantage with primary dealership, and allocative efficiencies-which researchers 
actively investigate these days (e.g., Cassola, Hortacsu, and Kastl, 2013; Hortacsu, 
Kastl, and Zhang, 2018; Bonaldi, Hortacsu, and Song, 2015). However, one of the 
contributions of this study is that an alternating auction rule experiment has the 
legitimate potential to uncover underlying economic incentives. Thus, we leave an 
investigation of these advanced topics to future researchers who can exploit Treasury 










3.8 Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 3.1: Results of the balance test for covariates 
Variable Uniform Discriminatory t-Value 
Market yield of Chinese bonds one day 





















Log value of maturing bonds by 











This table reports the mean, the 95% confidence intervals and the calculated t-values 
for prior day's yield curve, duration, market volatility, and value of maturing bonds by 
the institution for a given month of the CDB and the EIB government bonds sold 
through uniform and discriminatory auctions. The variable duration refers to Macaulay 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3. A 
3. A.1 Extra Tables 
This is the supplementary material for \Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: 
Evidence from the Chinese Experiment." It contains additional tables and figures used 
in the study that are necessary to fully document the research contained in the study and 




















Table 3.A.1: Chinese government and policy banks' security credit ratings 
Year Fitch Moody's Standard & Poor's 
MOF CDB EIB MOF CDB EIB MOF CDB EIB 
Panel A: Long-term 
2012 A+ A+ A+ Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 
2013 A+ A+ A+ Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 
2014 A+ A+ A+ Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 
2015 A+ A+ A+ Aa3 Aa3 Aa3 AA- AA- AA- 
Panel B: Short-term 
2012 F1 F1 F1 P-1 -- -- A-1+ A-1+ A-1+ 
2013 F1 F1 F1 P-1 -- -- A-1+ A-1+ A-1+ 
2014 F1 F1 F1 P-1 P-1 -- A-1+ A-1+ A-1+ 
2015 F1 F1 F1 P-1 P-1 -- A-1+ A-1+ A-1+ 
This table reports the long-term and short-term credit ratings awarded by Moody's, 
Standard Poor's, and Fitch to the Chinese government bonds issued by the Minister of 
Finance (MOF), the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) and the Export- Import Bank 
(EIB). If a rate was updated in the middle of a calendar year, the updated rate is listed. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A.4: Regression results for number of bidders 
Variable Number of bidders 
PPML OLS 













Market yield of Chinese bonds one 











































Log value of maturing bonds by 









Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First and last week of the month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market drift Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 348 301 348 301 
𝑅2 0.570 0.593 0.541 0.557 
This table presents the estimates for the number of bidders in an auction, controlling for 
auction type, institutions, market conditions, time gap between auctions by institutions, 
demand and supply ratio of bonds, institution effects, first and last week of the month, 
monthly effects, year effects, and market drift. The variable duration refers to Macaulay 
duration, which is the weighted average term to maturity of the cash flows from a bond. 
We estimate this using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method and 






Appendix 3. B 
3. B.1 Robustness tests 
In this section of the supplementary material we perform additional tests to ensure that 
our results are robust. First, we examine whether there is a difference in normalized 
rates between auction formats due to the high and low yield rates observed in 
discriminatory auctions. Second, we investigate whether bidders are potentially aware 
of the alternating-rule auction format during the experiment and behave strategically by 
choosing the most profitable auction mechanism. Third, we investigate whether our 
results hold for the full distributions of normalized rates by re-estimating the empirical 
models using the quantile regression method. Lastly, we examine whether there are any 
differences in the auction yield rates between uniform and discriminatory auctions held 
by the CDB and EIB individually. The tables and figures related to these robustness 
tests' results are presented in the end of this supplementary material. 
3. B. 1. 1 High and low auction rates in discriminatory auctions 
In the main estimation results presented in Table 3.2, we consider only the auction-
specific normalized weighted average winning bids. One could argue that the difference 
between auction formats might differ when we measure outcomes with the highest or 
the lowest winning auction rates observed in discriminatory auctions. To address this 
concern, we re-estimate our models with the normalized highest and lowest winning 
primary bids for discriminatory auctions using the specification in Table 3.2, Column 3 
for OLS regression and in Column 6 for Bayesian estimation. Note that, in 
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discriminatory auctions, the average range between the normalized highest and lowest 
winning bids is 0.032 percent with a standard deviation of 0.026. 
In Table 3.B.1, we report the results for normalized weighted-average auction winning 
rate-based uniform auctions and highest and lowest winning bids of discriminatory 
auctions. The first two columns in Table 3.B.1 report the OLS estimation results, and 
the last two columns report the results of the Bayesian estimation. The results indicate 
that our main finding that there is no statistical difference between uniform and 
discriminatory formats-holds true for the normalized highest and lowest bids of 
discriminatory auctions compared to uniform auctions as well. 
3. B. 1. 2 Restricted sample: without floating bond 
As mentioned before, we observed 47 floating bonds, auctioned off using only the 
uniform auction format. As a robustness check, we drop these 47 auctions and re-
estimate our main empirical models. We report OLS results in the first three columns 
and Bayesian results in the last three columns of Table 3.B.2. The first and the fourth 
columns report results for normalized weighted-average normalized rates for uniform 
and discriminatory auctions. In Columns 2 and 5, we report results using the normalized 
highest bids while, in Columns 3 and 6, we report the normalized lowest bids of 
discriminatory auctions. In all columns, we estimate the full model described in 
Columns 3 and 6 in Table 3.2. As in our earlier estimations, results indicate that there 







3. B.1.3 Bidders' behaviour in alternating auctions 
Next, given that the CDB and EIB alternated between the two auction formats with 
remarkable regularity for three years, one could argue that bidders (financial institutions 
that participate in the primary market) could have been aware of the upcoming auction 
formats and, therefore, waited for the auction format that was most profitable to them. 
To test this potential threat to our research design, we conduct a number of exercises. 
First, one may note that, if bidders wait for the format that is most favourable to them, 
they will behave differently in the first half of the experiment (when they are unaware 
that the issuing banks are alternating the auction formats) compared to the second half 
(after realizing the pattern of the experiment). To test this, we divide the CDB and EIB 
data into two periods-the first and second half of the experiment. We again estimate 
similar empirical models presented in Table 3.2, Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6. Our results are 
presented in Table 3.B.3 and indicate that there is no statistical difference between 
uniform and discriminatory auction yields in the first or the second half of the 
experiment. This suggests that bidders did not change their bidding patterns throughout 
the experiment. 
Next, we record bidder participation by examining the average number of bidders by 
auction type during the experiment. During the experiment, the uniform auctions 
attracted 34.30 (5.82) bidders on average per auction, while discriminatory auctions 
attracted 35.88 (4.88) bidders on average (standard deviations are in parentheses). When 
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considering the average number of bidders by institution, the CDB averaged 33.99 (5.26) 
bidders per auction, while the EIB averaged 38.54(4.56).42 
In Figure 3.B.1, we have plotted the weekly average of the number of bidders per 
auction for all Treasury notes by auction mechanism during the experiment. One can 
observe that both auction types have similar patterns for the average number of bidders 
per auction. If bidders were using a dynamic waiting strategy, the number of participants 
in discriminatory and uniform auctions would move in opposite directions throughout 
the auction series. The figure does not reveal such a counter-cyclical movement pattern. 
Instead, it shows that the number of bidders remains similar across auction formats 
during the experimental period, indicating that bidders did not wait for their preferred 
auction format.43 
In addition to this, we formally test whether there is a difference in the number of 
bidders in the first and second half of the experiment depending on the auction format. 
We regress the number of bidders on the auction mechanism dummy, a variable that 
indicates that the auction is let during the second half (second half indicator) and also 
on another variable that captures the difference between uniform and discriminatory 
auctions in the second half (second half indicator × discriminatory auction indicator). 
We also control for observable auction and market characteristics. In Table 3.B.4, we 
report estimations using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method in 
                                               
42 There were no Treasury instruments with maturities greater than one year or less than 10 years 
(Treasury notes) sold using the discriminatory auction format before or after the experiment by either 
institution. For this reason, we cannot compare the number of bidders per auction before, after, and 
during the experimental period. 
43 Kang and Puller (2008) conclude that, in Korean Treasury auctions, there is a slight revenue 
advantage for the discriminatory format, but the revenue difference between the two formats is quite 
small due to the competitiveness of the market. The average number of bidders in Korean auctions is 
smaller than in Chinese auctions and, hence, the Chinese market could be considered more competitive 
than the Korean market. Note that, on average, the Korean auctions have about seven and 10 less 
bidders in uniform and discriminatory auctions, respectively, compared to similar Chinese auctions. 
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Column 1, and the OLS method in Column 2. All our estimated results in Table 3.B.4 
indicate that there is no statistical difference between the number of bidders in uniform 
and discriminatory auctions in the first and second period. 
Another possible way to examine the robustness of bidder participation and normalized 
rates results is to investigate the differences of these outcomes just before and after the 
experiment. However, such a comprehensive investigation is not possible as the CDB 
and the EIB did not use discriminatory auctions prior to or following the experiment 
period. Alternatively, we compare the bidder participation and auction yield outcomes 
in uniform auctions during and 12 months after the experiment period. Our results 
indicate that the bidders did not behave differently during and after the experiment 
period (See Table 3.B.5 in the supplementary material).44 
These exercises further support the notion that bidders (i) did not discriminate between 
auction formats as part of a static participation or dynamic waiting strategy, due to the 
rigidly framed non-overlapping auction announcement cycles, and (ii) did not behave 
differently during and after the experiment period. It is worth noting that, as the 
institutions neither officially nor publicly announced the end date of the experiment, the 
CDB and EIB could have stopped the experiment at any given time, making a potential 
forward-looking waiting strategy impossible for bidders. 
 
 
                                               
44 In principle, we could examine whether there were any differences in bidder entry and auction 
outcomes focusing only on uniform auctions. However, such a comparison faces challenges, as before 
the experiment period, auctions were much less frequent and had smaller volumes. As a natural 
consequence of less-frequent trading opportunities, the number of participating bidders and outcome 




3. B.1.4 Effect on the distribution of bids 
A potential concern is that our results may not hold for the full distribution of the 
normalized weighted average outcome of the yield. To address this issue, we re-estimate 
the empirical models using the quantile regression method for the  15𝑡ℎ, 25𝑡ℎ, 50𝑡ℎ, 
75𝑡ℎ, and 85𝑡ℎ quantiles. We present these estimated results in Table 3.B.6.45 Note that 
these empirical specifications are similar to the ones presented in Table 3.2, Column 3. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the ones shown in the OLS tables and indicate 
that there is no significant difference between outcomes generated from the two auction 
formats (Panel A). In Panel B, we report results using the normalized highest yield while, 
in Panel C, we report the normalized lowest yield of discriminatory auctions. We also 
estimate these specifications without floating bids, obtaining qualitatively similar 
results that indicate that there is no statistical difference between normalized rates based 
on auction formats. These results are not presented in this study, but can be provided 
upon request.4647 
                                               
45 Hahn (1995) shows that the asymptotic variance matrix of the quantile regression estimator depends 
on the density of the error. Hahn notes that, for regressors, the bootstrap distribution is shown to 
converge weakly to the limit distribution of the quantile regression estimator in probability. Therefore, 
the confidence intervals constructed by the bootstrap procedures have shown to provide asymptotically 
valid estimators. Hence, we obtain standard errors (reported in Table 3.B.6) via bootstrapping the 
variance-covariance matrix. Note that we implement the bootstrap procedure by repeating the 
regression 100 times on a randomly drawn new sample with replacement from the original data. 
46 A minor exception is that, in Panel C Table 3.B.6, when comparing the lowest normalized winning 
bids of discriminatory auctions with normalized uniform winning bid rates, we observe that the 
discriminatory auction rate is lower by -0.060% (-6.00 bps) compared to uniform auctions in the 85𝑡ℎ 
quantile. 
47 Note that here we are using the quantile method proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). This 
method essentially estimates a conditional Quantile Treatment Effect (QTE) under exogeneity (see 
Frolich and Melly, 2013). In our case, we have argued that the implementation of the two auction 
mechanism is random. Hence, our quantile regression results can also be treated as evidence from 
conditional QTE approach. 
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3. B.1.5 CDB vs. EIB 
During our sample period, the experiments were conducted by the two institutions 
separately. Hence, we next examine whether there are any differences in the normalized 
rates between uniform and discriminatory auctions by institution. To do this, we re-
estimate the models presented in Table 3.2, Columns 3 and 6, by institution. The results 
are presented in Table 3.B.7. Columns 1 and 2, present the OLS results for the CDB 
with and without floating bonds. In Column 3, we report the OLS results for the EIB. 
Columns 4-6, present the Bayesian results for the normalized rates. All columns indicate 
that, regardless of the institution, the revenues generated from the two auction 














Figure 3.B.1: Number of bidders by auction type 
 
Notes: This figure plots the weekly average number of bidders per auction for all 









Table 3.B.1: Regression results for normalized rates with highest and lowest 
discriminatory auction rates 
Variable Normalized rate 
OLS Bayesian 
Highest Lowest Highest Lowest 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
















Auction and market 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First and last week of 
the month 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month and year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market drift Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 348 348 348 348 
𝑅2 0.499 0.492   
Log marginal 
likelihood 
  -279.097 -282.579 
This table reports OLS and Bayesian regressions of normalized rates with highest and 
lowest discriminatory auction bids. Our dependent variables is the auction-specific 
normalized highest (Columns 1 and 3) and the lowest (Columns 2 and 4) winning rate 
on a given date. In all columns, we control for auction format, other auction, and market 
characteristics in addition to month effects, year effects, market drift, and bond-issuer 
fixed effects. In Columns 1-2, 95% confidence intervals calculated based on robust 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.B.4: Results for number of bidders during the experiment 
Variable Number of bidders 
 PPML OLS 
















Auction and market controls Yes Yes 
Institution effects Yes Yes 
First and last week of the month Yes Yes 
Month and year effects Yes Yes 
Market drift Yes Yes 
Observations 348 348 
𝑅2 0.576 0.590 
This table presents the estimates for the number of bidders in an auction, controlling 
auction type, institutions, market conditions, the time gap between auctions by 
institutions, demand, and supply ratio of bonds, and institution effects which are 
denoted by auction and market controls. Additionally, we have included month effects, 















Table 3.B.5: Bidder behaviour in uniform auctions during and after the experiment 
Variable Number of bidders Normalized rate 













Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 389 389 
𝑅2 0.394 0.353 
This table presents the estimates for the number of bidders and normalized rates in 
auctions controlling for after experiment period, institutions, market conditions, time 
gap between auctions by institutions, demand and supply ratio of bonds, institution 
effects, and all other market and time controls. The Column 1 is estimated using the 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method and Column 2 is estimated 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bond Losses and Systemic Risk 
 
‘On Friday afternoon, the volume-weighted average rate of the benchmark seven-day 
REPO traded in the interbank market, considered the best indicator of general liquidity 
in China, was 2.6024 percent, or 4.92 basis points higher than the previous week's 
closing average rate of 2.5532 percent. The Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) 
for the same tenor stayed at 2.6290 percent, up 3 basis points from the previous week's 
close of 2.5990 percent. The one-day or overnight rate stood at 2.3400 percent and the 
14-day REPO stood at 2.4459 percent. A trader at a regional bank in Shanghai said 
liquidity conditions tightened on Friday following a 50-year bond auction by China's 
finance ministry that attracted stronger-than-expected demand. “Yields fell a lot, and 
traders came in chasing them,” she said.’ 
                                                                                 (Reuters, November 16, 2018) 
4.1 Introduction 
Recent studies have shown that the trading of bonds is a major part of banks' activities 
and accounts for a significant share of their revenues (King, Massoud, and Song, 2013; 
Begenau, Piazzesi, and Schneider, 2015). Hence, losses in this market can have 
significant consequences for banks as well as for the stability of the banking sector. The 
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2007-2008 global financial crisis, for instance, has shown how bank losses can cause 
instability in global financial systems and lead to severe macroeconomic fluctuations 
(De Bandt, Hartmann, and Peydro, 2010). 
A carry trade strategy based on the purchase of risky sovereign debts using funds 
provided by government banks (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Popov and Van Horen, 
2014) and financial repression (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2015; Becker and Ivashina, 2018) 
have been documented as important causes of bank losses in the sovereign bond markets. 
The authors note that these losses can lead to a decrease in a bank's capitalization value 
and also a reduction in credit supply. Another way of incurring losses is through 
participation in Treasury bond markets where financial institutions buy securities in 
primary market auctions and sell them in the secondary market. As the most optimistic 
primary market dealer wins the auction, and may end up paying more than the amount 
they could extract from the secondary market, the financial institution could be exposed 
to winner's curse (Bukhchandani and Huang, 1989, 1993; Nyborg, Rydqvist, and 
Sundaresan, 2002). 
In this study, we show that banks make substantial losses in the process of buying 
(bidding for) on-the-run Treasury bonds in the primary markets and reselling them in 
the secondary market due to tight liquidity conditions. Using a novel dataset that tracks 
primary-to-secondary transactions in the Treasury bond market, we measure the loss or 
gain as the difference between primary and secondary market returns on the debut-day 
(the initial secondary market trading day for a given bond).48 We show that, when this 
                                               
48 Our definition of gain/loss is motivated by IPO literature and for example, see Ljungqvist (2007). 
Another reason behind our focus on on-the-run bonds is that these bonds are relatively liquid while off-
the-run issues are substantially illiquid, as reported by Fleming (2002). 
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inter-market margin is negative, the primary market dealer incurs a loss in their market 
value, which is a possible source of financial market instability. 
This study has three objectives. First, we show that significant losses exist in the bond 
market even after controlling for bond and market characteristics. Using a unique data 
set from China, which contains trades of more than 2,350 Treasury bonds in primary 
and secondary markets from 2004-2017, we calculate the difference between primary 
and secondary market returns-the effective return for a bond.49 We exploit the rare 
timing structure of the Chinese government bond issuance process where short trades 
are strictly prohibited. Due to the simple market structure and the no-short-trade 
regulation, we are able to investigate the channel and information structure of systemic 
risk observed in post-auction periods. Another advantage of our measurement is that it 
allows us to focus on an analysis of potential liquidity constraints rather than a 
combination of liquidity and short-position constraints. Differently, previous studies 
had to develop empirical strategies to measure bond losses (or gains) as it is required to 
disentangle speculative short trades under the intricate information revelation 
environment (Jordan and Jordan, 1997; Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2003). 
We document negative margins for about 20% of the observed transactions even after 
adjusting for bond and market conditions. This result shows that primary dealer losses 
are prevalent in Treasury bond markets. Given our temporally extensive data set, which 
includes the 2007-2008 financial crisis, we are able to show the magnitude of losses 
before, during, and after the crisis. Our results indicate that, during the crisis, more than 
50% of post-auction Treasury transactions led to losses. These findings could be 
                                               
49 Note that China's government bond market was about $5.8 trillion in 2017. The total market, including 




informative for policymakers who are interested in understanding financial markets 
during a recession or who are interested in government security market (in)stability. 
The second objective of this study is to explore the question: if financial losses are 
prevalent for primary market dealers, what is the possible market mechanism behind 
these losses? In line with the Reuters (2018) quote above, we hypothesize that, when 
facing high borrowing costs, primary market dealers are willing to liquidate their on-
the-run bonds at a loss in order to minimize their financial distress. To test this possible 
explanation for bond market losses, we examine whether a change in the REPO rate can 
predict individual bond losses.50  As suggested by Reuters, the REPO rate is considered 
the best indicator of general liquidity in China. Further, we investigate the volume of 
secondary market debut-day trades when the REPO rate is high. We expect the volume 
of bond trades to be higher when primary market dealers face high borrowing costs as 
they can generate cash using bond sales (meaning that the supply of bonds in the 
secondary market is higher). The results indicate that, when REPO rates are high, the 
probability of observing bond losses is higher and the secondary market volume is also 
higher. 
Third, having documented the existence of bond losses and their liquidity channels, we 
inquire whether bond losses can lead to financial market instability. As liquidity 
constraints constitute private information within a primary dealer, bond losses 
inevitably generate new public information among financial market participants. As a 
consequence, this new public information could become a common reference point for 
all traders, possibly resulting in a banking sector-wide capitalization value shock. 
                                               
50 The REPO rate is the volume-weighted average rate of the benchmark seven-day repurchase 
agreement rate in the interbank market. 
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To investigate this hypothesis further, we examine the movements of the Chinese FTSE 
Russel financial indexes on debut-days when Chinese primary market dealers suffer 
significant secondary market bond losses.51 In this exercise, we first identify secondary 
market debut-days with significant bond losses using all secondary market debut-dates 
in which we observe only all positive or all negative margins. We then create a balanced 
panel for these secondary market transactions with FTSE banking and security sector 
indexes two days prior to and two days after the secondary market debut date. Using 
this data, we estimate a model in the difference-in-difference (DID) spirit to examine 
the impact of bond losses on the financial sector. We find that FTSE indexes fell 
significantly--by about 0.5-0.7 percent--following bond loss days compared to all 
positive days. This means that a negative return on an initial secondary market trading 
day transaction (which could have been caused by just one primary dealer) generates a 
disturbance in the entire Chinese financial sector's capitalization value. This finding 
further supports our hypothesis that bond losses can lead to financial market instability 
and also indicates that bond losses play a sizable informational role. Similarly, the fact 
that REPO rates remain the same after negative transaction days also suggests that bond 
losses can lead to financial market instability. 
This study contributes to the literature on government security auctions and their market 
design. Preceding studies of Treasury auctions and related bond markets have 
concentrated on which auction format generates higher revenues (i.e., lower yields) for 
                                               
51 FTSE Chinese financial indices include 600 large and mid-cap A-share stocks listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. As these indices provide broad coverage of Chinese financial 
institutions and stock markets, they contain information about the financial health of banks and insurance 
companies in China overall. Further, note that more than 90 percent of financial institutions that represent 
the FTSE banking, security, and insurance indexes are also primary dealers who participate in 
government security auctions. 
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Treasuries.52 However, yield (or price) gaps in financial assets, specifically between 
primary and secondary markets, have been called to attention by financial economists 
as well as scholars studying friction in financial markets. Among a few influential 
studies, Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) investigate mark-ups and information ow 
before and after bid submissions.53  We contribute to this literature by investigating the 
inter-market yield gap and its informational role in market stability.54 
This study also contributes to the existing literature on bond losses. Previous studies 
show that bond losses during 2007-2012 were caused by the acquisition of the risky 
GIPSI (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy) sovereign bonds (Acharya and 
Steffen, 2015; Popov and Van Horen, 2014; Becker and Ivashina, 2018). Acharya and 
Steffen (2015) show that those bank losses were derived from the European banks' carry 
trade strategy: the purchase of risky sovereign debt using funding provided by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Popov and Van Horen (2014) find that banks with 
sizeable holdings of GIPSI sovereign bonds saw a decline in their credit supply, and 
Becker and Ivashina (2018) show that financial repression led to bank losses and the 
crowding out of corporate lending. Differently, we show that large fluctuations in the 
money market rates could generate bond losses that decrease the financial sector's 
market value. 
                                               
52  For example, Hortascsu and McAdams (2010) and Kastl (2011) have reported Counterfactual 
simulation-based methods for revenue comparisons. On the other hand, Brenner (2009) indicates that 
financial institutions tend to prefer the discriminatory-pricing rule to the uniform rule because of the 
direct controllable payment upon winning. 
53 Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) define `mark-up' as the gap between the auction yield and the when-
issued market transaction yield, which is also the return obtained by a dealer in the bond market. They 
find mixed statistically significant difference in mark-ups between uniform and discriminatory auctions. 
However, they do show that the size and frequency of pre-auction transactions are higher for uniform 
auctions, suggesting a higher degree of information release to mitigate winner's curse. 
54 Another strand of the winner's curse literature concentrates on procurement auctions of oil-drilling 
leases. For instance, the presence of winner's curse in o_-shore oil drilling was first noted by Capen et al. 




In addition, our study contributes to the literature on government security issuance 
market (in) stability. Preceding studies focus on instability related to short squeezes 
(e.g., Jegadeesh, 1993; Jordan and Jordan, 1996; and Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2003). In 
the spirit of this literature, our study investigates potential policy options that could curb 
abnormal market behaviour. Specifically, we investigate which auction mechanism-
uniform or discriminatory-is better at reducing losses. As we show, negative margins in 
the bond market can have a significant effect on the capitalization value of the financial 
sector. Thus, a government interested in promoting financial stability would benefit 
from knowing which auction mechanism best mitigates bond losses. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to show a linkage between bond losses (a possible 
indicator of winner's curse), liquidity constraints, auction mechanisms, and financial 
sector-wide instability, as well as clarifying the information transmission channels 
behind them.55 
In order to evaluate which auction mechanism (uniform or discriminatory) alleviates 
possible bond losses, we use an alternating market experiment conducted by two 
Chinese government bond issuers. We find that the share of transactions with bond 
losses is higher in discriminatory auctions than in uniform auctions. This result suggests 
that a government-as a bond issuer-could adopt uniform auctions to reduce bond losses 
and mitigate financial distress. As far as we know, earlier studies have not investigated 
bond losses linked to financial sector instability under an alternating-rule market 
experiment to answer this policy-relevant question. 
                                               
55  It is worth mentioning that, with resale opportunities, the theoretical literature on multiple-unit 
common-value auctions does not provide a clear-cut conclusion as to which auction mechanism (uniform 
or discriminatory) best minimizes winner's curse (see Mester, 1995.) See the seminal works of 
Bukhchandani and Huang (1989 and 1993), Nyborg and Sundaresan's (1996), and Nyborg, Rydqvist, and 
Sundaresan, (2002) for an early analysis of winner's curse in bond markets. 
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The remainder of the study proceeds as follows: The next section gives a background 
to the Chinese government bond-issuing institutions, and their primary and secondary 
markets. Section 4.3 describes the data, employing summary statistics. Section 4.4 
defines the debut-day measure of returns in the Chinese bond market. Section 4.5 
investigates borrowing cost-based liquidity constraints and bond losses. Section 4.6 
reports results on the relationship between bond losses and financial stability. Section 
4.7 evaluates the policy question of which auction mechanism best mitigates bond 
losses, based on a market experiment conducted by the Chinese government bond 
issuers. Section 4.8 concludes the analysis. 
4.2 Institutional background 
4.2.1 Government bond issuers 
In this subsection, we describe the institutional backgrounds of the Chinese Government 
Bond Issuers: the Chinese Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Chinese Development Bank 
(CDB), the Export-Import Bank (EIB), and the Agriculture Development Bank of China 
(ADB). 
4.2.1.1 The Chinese Ministry of Finance 
Initiated by the MOF, the history of Chinese government securities was closely related 
to the establishment and economic development of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC). In 1949, the MOF launched their first bonds, called “People's Victory Bonds,” 
to fund large military expenditures and regenerate the national economy. In 1953, three 
years after the founding of the PRC, to rebuild the economy and complete “The Plan of 
the First Five Years,” the MOF decided to issue bonds to cover a large financial deficit. 
These securities were called “National Economic Construction Government Bonds,” 
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and the bond issuance lasted until 1958. These two bonds were regarded as the 
precursors to today's Chinese government securities. However, between 1958 and 1980, 
China did not issue any bonds. 
In 1979, the Chinese government implemented a profit-retention scheme among state-
owned companies, which led to an increase in the discrepancy between fiscal revenue 
and expenditure.56  Accordingly, in early 1980s, the Chinese government suffered from 
a fiscal deficit. In 1981, to solve this fiscal challenge, the Chinese government decided 
to resume issuing bonds.57  Since the early 1980s, the contemporary Chinese bond 
market has developed rapidly, and the MOF began to use a system of primary dealers 
in 1993. In 1995, for the first time, the MOF used auctions as a mechanism to sell 
government securities. Subsequently, in 1996, auctions became the only method used 
to issue bonds in the primary market. 
In 2002, some Chinese treasury bonds experienced failure in the primary market, as 
their cut-o_ rate exceeded the MOF-set upper limit, which was based on the secondary 
market yield from the previous trading day. As the MOF used only the uniform-price 
auction format (an auction format in which there is a unique market-clearing yield) at 
that time, the auctions failed to sell bonds, if the cut-off yield exceeded the upper limit. 
In 2003, to mitigate this operational challenge, the MOF introduced the discriminatory 
auction rule (an auction in which bidders pay what they bid). Additionally, starting in 
2004, the MOF decided to employ the Spanish (hybrid) auction format to further 
alleviate the issues with upper rate limit. The MOF used weighted-average winning 
rates, instead of the secondary market yield, as a reference point to set the upper rate 
                                               
56 Shen and Cao (2014. p4). 
57 From 1981 to 1984, the Chinese government issued securities worth ¥ 4 billion per year. The total 
volume increased to ¥ 6 billion per year during 1985-1986. 
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limit.58 However, since 2016, the MOF has discontinued using discriminatory auctions, 
and has started using only hybrid auctions to sell bonds with maturities of less than one 
year. Accordingly, the MOF currently only uses uniform and Spanish auctions to sell 
its bonds. 
4.2.1.2 The Chinese Development Bank 
In 1994, the CDB was founded, and its main financial missions are middle- and long-
term fund operations for national projects initiated by the central government. 
Administratively, the CDB is governed by the Central Bank. In 1994, the CDB started 
to issue policy-bank bonds for the first time. However, the CDB was initially 
unsuccessful in allocating bonds, especially in terms of attracting dealers and, as a 
consequence, was required to reform its issuance mechanism. In 1995, the bank began 
to use auctions to issue bonds in the primary market. In the early periods, the CDB 
issued mainly short- and middle-term bonds (less than or equal to five years), and later 
expanded their bond maturities to long-term bonds (more than five years). The CDB 
also issued bonds with different payment mechanisms to satisfy financial market 
demand. Interestingly, the CDB also offers bonds with floating interest rates. Currently, 
the CDB uses uniform auctions to sell its bonds. 
4.2.1.3 The Export-Import Bank and the Agriculture Development Bank 
The EIB and the ADB were both founded in 1994. Like the CDB, the EIB and ADB are 
administered by the Central Bank, and their missions are to implement national projects 
                                               
58 If a bid deviated from the weighted-average winning rate more than a certain and discretionary range 
in an auction, the bid was treated as invalid. Note that the range is announced five working days before 
the auction, and could be different for each bond. 
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determined by the central government. Note that, throughout the auction history of the 
EIB and ADB, both institutions have offered some bonds with floating interest rates. 
The EIB's main mission is to provide financial support to promote the international trade 
of Chinese products, especially mechanical and electronic products. It also provides 
funding to Chinese high-tech companies to develop an advantage in international 
competition. In 1999, the EIB started using auction mechanisms to issue bonds, mainly 
through the uniform-price rule, but also occasionally through discriminatory auctions. 
We will provide further descriptions of the EIB's auction formats in Section 4.7. 
Lastly, the ADB is a policy bank that supports national projects related to the Chinese 
agricultural sector by providing loans and funds. The bank was established in 1994, but 
began to use auctions to issue bonds in 2004. Notably, the ADB has only ever employed 
the uniform-price format in its auctions. Compared to other policy banks, the ADB's 
bond auctions have smaller volumes. 
4.2.2 Chinese bond issuers and credit ratings 
In this subsection, we discuss the credit ratings associated with the four Chinese 
government and policy bank security-issuing institutions. There are three major 
institutional rating characteristics and they are: (i) credit ratings are homogeneous 
within each year during our period of analysis; (ii) bonds issued by the four institutions 
are all backed by the Chinese government; (iii) ratings for individual bonds are non-
existent. Tables 4.A.1 and 4.A.2 report the long- and short-term credit ratings issued by 
three foreign agencies: Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. 
First, regarding the ratings for the four institutions, we observe that the four bond issuers 
are awarded the same credit ratings by each agency within the same calendar year, with 
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the exception of the CDB's short-term rating in 2004. However, ratings vary over the 
years due to macro-level economic fluctuations and China's fiscal/taxation ability. Note 
that, in our empirical analysis, we primarily use data from 2004-2017, where all four 
institutions were actively selling their bonds. 
Second, China has distinctive political characteristics regarding its fiscal and national 
project operations under the framework of the socialistic market economy. Specifically, 
the MOF is directly governed by the State Council. In addition, the People's Bank of 
China (the Central Bank)-which administers the CDB, EIB, and ADB-is operated by 
the National People's Congress.59 However, the State Council and the National People's 
Congress are both under the administration of the Presidency of China, which represents 
the Chinese Communist Party government. Indeed, it is widely accepted by bond market 
participants that the bonds issued by the four institutions are all backed by the Chinese 
government (e.g., Chen, 2010). As a consequence, during our sample period, the four 
bond-issuing institutions have the same within-year long-term credit ratings, awarded 
by the three foreign rating agencies. 
Third, although credit ratings were awarded for the four bond-issuing institutions (i.e., 
institutional ratings), to the best of our knowledge, these four institutions had not 
solicited any credit rating agencies to rate their individual bonds until the middle of 
2017.60 Thus until recently, each Government Security auction was held without an 
individual bond credit rating. 
                                               
59 The Governor of the People's Bank of China is appointed by the National People's Congress; yet the 
nomination of the Governor is made by the Premier of the People's Republic of China, the leader of the 
State Council. See the following Bloomberg article regarding the relation between the policies of the 
Chinese Government and the People's Bank of China: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-
03-11/people-s-bank-of-china-gainsa-little-independence 
60 Chen (2014) indicates that the three Chinese policy banks enjoy Chinese government-
guaranteed sovereign credit ratings. 
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4.2.2.1 The selection of primary dealers 
In order to bid in Chinese government security auctions, primary dealers must be 
prequalified. The MOF's primary dealer groups were organized once a year from 2000 
to 2008, and the frequency changed to once every three years since 2009. In order to 
identify qualified primary dealers, the MOF created a document of prequalification 
rules, known as Management Rules of Organizing Treasury Bond Underwriting Groups. 
The prequalification is based on each dealer's financial capacity, past performance, 
value, and volume of trading over the past three years. An independent committee of 
experts ranks primary dealers according to these criteria. Based on this ranking, the 
MOF chooses the primary dealers that can participate in the primary market. For the 
MOF, for instance, if the target number of primary bidders is 50. The top 45 primary 
dealers are allowed to continue for another year (or term), and other dealers compete 
for the remaining five seats.61 The CDB, EIB, and ADB also use a similar method to 
build their primary groups, but they do not impose a bidding minimum volume for 
primary dealers. 62  In this study, we refer to all prequalified dealers as “primary” 
dealers.63 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of primary dealers in China is their 
overlapping nature across the four bond-issuing institutions. As Figure 4.1 shows, 
during the period 2004-2017, more than 50 percent of primary dealers submitted bids 
                                               
61 At the MOF, after the selection of primary dealers, the top 20 primary dealers in the group become 
high-ranked primary dealers, and the rest of the primary dealers are identified as lower-ranked primary 
dealers. High- and low-ranked primary dealers have different obligations in terms of minimum volumes: 
While high-ranked primary dealers need to bid at least four percent of the total volume in an auction, 
lower-ranked primary dealers only need to bid at least one percent. 
62 Differently from the MOF, these policy banks do not classify their primary dealers as high- and low-
ranked. 
63 The number of registered bidders is plotted in Figure 4.A.1, while Figure 4. A.2 plots the year-to-year 
continuing incumbents. More than 90 percent of bidders continue from the previous year, and more than 
50 percent of bidders who participated in 2004 are still in the market in 2017 (see Figure 4.A.3). 
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to all four institutions' auctions (MOF, CDB, EIB, ADB). Moreover, around 25 percent 
of primary dealers submitted bids across the CDB, EIB, and ADB. Given these facts, 
we can reasonably conclude that, in Chinese government-related Treasury auctions, a 
bidder faces the same group of competing financial institutions. This nearly-duplicated 
competitor environment is an appealing situation for an empirical study, as auction 
outcomes across different institutions are reasonably comparable. 
4.2.2.2 Secondary market of government and policy bank bonds 
In this study, following the IPO initial return literature, we use spot market data from 
the secondary market debut-days for each on-the-run bond, extracted from the inter-
bank and security markets in China. The secondary market debut-day is the date on 
which primary market participants are allowed to trade a new issuance in the secondary 
market for the first time. 
Chinese government and policy bank bonds have a rigorous timeline regarding 
secondary market appearance. Specifically, primary market participants are prohibited 
from trading newly issued bonds at a secondary market for a certain period after an 
auction-typically five business days.64 Compared to the U.S., in China, the number of 
when-issued transactions (that take place between the announcement of a security 
auction and the issuing date) is almost non-existence. In fact, the only permitted short-
trade transactions are of MOF notes with a maturity of 7 years, and when-issued trades 
for other government securities are strictly prohibited. 65  Thus, in China, financial 
                                               
64 The typical length of no-resale-activity restrictions is five business days, although it varies across 
institutions and auction dates, primarily due to public holidays. 
65 In China, when-issued transactions started in 2013. The Shanghai Security Exchange (SSE), which 
organizes trades in the when-issued markets for Chinese bonds, began by stimulating trades of MOF 
notes with a maturity of 7 years. However, since the start, the market has failed to attract potential 
participants, and only a small number of infrequent transactions have occurred. Indeed, we observe no 
when-issued transactions for the 7-year MOF issuances since December 2015. For this reason, when-
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market participants are typically informed of the secondary market price/yield of an on-
the-run issue five business days after an auction. 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Primary and secondary market data 
We obtain data on primary and secondary market transactions of the Chinese bond 
market from two data sources-the Wind Database and Chinabond.com.cn. The Wind 
Database is obtained from the Wind Information Co. Ltd., a financial data and 
information provider in China. Chinabond.com.cn is the official website of the China 
Central Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd. (CCDC), which is the only government bond 
deposit authorized by the MOF. The CCDC is responsible for the establishment and 
operation of the government bond depository system.66 
The Chinese inter-bank market consists of three sections: spot, call, and REPO markets. 
Throughout this research, we focus on spot market data as bond IDs are available for 
spot market transactions and we are able to match them with primary auction market 
outcomes. During our sample period of 2004-2017, the spot market trading volumes of 
the inter-bank market are far larger than those in the security markets.67  Further, our 
study use data only from bonds issued through auctions, as information about issue rates 
                                               
issued transactions are not considered in this study. Visit the website for details: 
http://www.sse.com.cn/services/tradingservice/tbondp/home/. 
66  The CCDC is a State Council-approved agency system (also authorized by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission) which conducts registrations; principal, coupon, and interest payments; and 
depository and other government bond-related transactions. Note that the CCDC was formerly known as 
China Government Securities Depository Trust & Clearing Co., Ltd. 
67 For example, in the calendar year 2009, the trading volume of the interbank spot market was ¥ 48,868 
billion, while it was only ¥ 179 million in the security markets. Source: ChinaBond.com and the People's 
Bank of China Report in 2009. 
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(or prices) are only available for auctioned bonds. Note that since 2004 all institutions 
started relying only on auctions to sell their bonds. 
The Wind Database provides access to details of primary market data on bond auctions 
held by the MOF, CDB, EIB and ADB from 1998 to 2017. Our data contains not only 
information of auctioned bonds, such as bond ID, maturity, auction method, size of each 
auction, and tender subjects (e.g., price or rate), but also the auction outcomes of 
weighted-average winning rate (or price), low and high winning rates, total demand, 
number of bidders, number of bids, number of winners, number of winning bids, and 
final coupon rate for each auction, as well as the presence or absence of floating coupons. 
We collected supplementary information from Chinabond.com, such as bond types, 
subsidies, coupon payment, and the frequency for each bond. These two datasets 
provide more than 2,900 primary market auctions. The Wind Database also provides 
relevant data of secondary re-sale markets. From this data, we obtain information on 
more than 2,350 secondary market debut-day transactions and, as in the primary market 
data, we observe the bond ID and the yield rate (or price) of bonds in the secondary 
market.68 This allows us to match each primary and secondary transaction by bond ID, 
which is a unique feature of our data. 
The Wind Database also provides secondary market yield data. As in Keloharju et al., 
(2005), we use the secondary market yield curve to calculate resale market volatilities 
by maturity. On each business day, the CCDC announces yield curves for bonds issued 
by the MOF, CDB, EIB, and ADB. These yield curves are based on the previous period's 
resale market transactions and provide official bond market information to investors. 
Daily yield curve data for each institution is available, since 2002 for the MOF and 
                                               
68 Due to small trading volumes, we excluded over-the-counter transactions from this research. 
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CDB, and since 2008 for the EIB and ADB. Using this data, we calculate the within-
five-business-day variance of the corresponding maturity, and use the volatility as a 
control variable for each issuance in our regression analyses. 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned earlier, all institutions started using auctions to sell their bonds in 2004. 
Therefore, in our sample, we use data from 2004 to 2017. During this period, we have 
2,951 primary market auction records. We observe that 2,371 of these primary auctions 
could successfully be matched with secondary market debut-day transactions using their 
unique bond IDs. Note that these secondary market data contain only the debut-day 
transactions of a bond. We begin our analysis by providing descriptive statistics for 
these matched transactions.69 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the data used in the analysis. In Panel A, we 
report summary statistics for auction-level characteristics. Out of the 2,371 auctions, for 
which we matched primary and secondary market information, 1,521 used the uniform 
auction (UA) format, and 285 used the discriminatory auction (DA) format. The rest 
were auctioned off using the Spanish auction format (also known as hybrid auction 
[HA]). The average yield for these bonds in the primary market rate is 3.63%.70 In our 
sample, most of the financial instruments fall into the category of notes (maturities 
ranging from more than one year to 10 years). Of these bonds, 168 had a floating coupon 
                                               
69 First, in Table 4.A.3, we present the number of bonds by institution and bond type. In the sample, we 
observe that the CDB is the largest auction organizer in terms of auction numbers, and the majority of 
the bonds are auctioned o_ as notes. In Table 4.A.4, we report the tabulations of bonds by auction 
mechanism and maturity period. One can observe that all three auction types are used for different types 
of bonds. 
70 In China, primary dealers receive subsidies when they acquire bonds in government auctions. Those 
subsidies take the form of rebate on the auction value of the bond. All bond rates in our dataset account 
for these subsidies. 
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rate, and were auctioned off only using the uniform format, starting in 2007. Further, 
they were used only for notes. We observe that, on average, there were about 40 bidders 
per auction. 
In Panel B, we report secondary market information. The average secondary market 
yield is about 3.75%. These bonds could be traded in the Chinese inter- bank market, 
or in the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. However, the inter-bank market 
accounted for 94.9% (2,213 out of 2,371) of secondary market transactions. 
Additionally, all floating bonds were traded in the inter-bank market. In our analysis, 
we use the time lag variable to capture idiosyncratic market variations within this short 
period. We also include monthly traded volume to control for the intensity of 
transactions by bond type and maturity. The average monthly volume is about ¥ 886 
billion by bank. 
In Panel C, we present the variables that capture possible changes in market conditions. 
Note that unobserved macroeconomic conditions and associated inflation expectations 
(or any other economic fundamentals) could change in the short time between the 
auction and the secondary market debut-days. We first show the average volatility of 
yield curves _ve days before the secondary market. This variable varies by bond type 
and maturity, and the calculated value is 0.03. We also use the five-day volatility of the 
FTSE Chinese Bank Index (and Security Index) to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
of the financial sector.71  Further, in our regression, we include a change in the yield 
curve (at a corresponding maturity and at each institution) as a control variable, 
controlling for financial market events occurring between the auction and debut-days.72 
                                               
71 Note that the Insurance Index started from 2007. 
72 Our outcome variable is the difference between the primary and secondary market yields. Hence, any 




Additionally, we use the total value of maturing bonds by institution for a given month, 
to control for issuer- level monthly demand for money (backlog). We also report the 
REPO rate, which is about 3% on average during the sample period. 
4.4 Returns in the Chinese bond market 
4.4.1 Definition of the adjusted margin 
Primary bond dealers in China purchase bonds in Treasury auctions to resell them in 
the secondary market. As mentioned before, given the non-existence of short-trade 
opportunities, these bidders know their effective margin only after selling these bonds 
in the secondary market, which typically does not open until five business days after a 
Treasury auction. 
Interestingly, we notice that more than 80 percent of the on-the-run bonds (i.e. about 
1,900 issuances out of 2,371) were sold on their first trading days in the secondary 
market. This prosperity of debut-day trades provides a great opportunity to quantify 
possible bond losses in the Chinese bond market, as we can observe both primary and 
debut-day secondary rates for a given bond. Therefore, following the convention of the 
IPO initial return literature, we define the margin for a given bond as the primary market 
rate minus the debut-day secondary market rate. 
Figure 4.2 shows the cumulative distribution (CDF) of this raw margin for our data. As 
we can see, many transactions are negative. However, we caution against the direct 
interpretation of this gap (or return) as bond losses, because this distribution is not 
controlled by any auction, bond, and financial market characteristics, which could vary 
between the primary auction day and the debut-day. Hence, our next step is to remove 
the observable effects of auction, bond, and market characteristics from this raw margin. 
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This removal will allow us to obtain a measure of the adjusted margin that is not driven 
by observables. Specifically, given the unique market and information structure, our 
measurement has a noisy public signal interpretation, which may reveal liquidity 
constraints within a primary market bidder (or bidders). The procedure to obtain this 
conditional measure is as follows. Specifically, we follow a bid homogenization 
introduced by Haile et al. (2006), which is widely used in empirical auction studies. 
First, we estimate the following regression, explaining the observed margin for a given 
bond (i) by institution (j) as a function of auction (x), bond (z), and market 
characteristics (m), as seen in Equation 4.1. 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾 + 𝑚𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜔 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡                                          (4.1) 
where 𝜏 is the time fixed-effects, 𝜃 is the institution effect, 𝛼 is the constant, and 
𝜖 is the residual. First, in the right-hand side of Equation (4.1), x, z, m and fixed effect 
terms are known to the financial market participants. Thus, 𝜖  captures the 
unobservable variation of the return that is not explained by the observable variables, 
including the privately-possessed liquidity constraint information. Here, the term of 
“unobservable” means unobserved information to researchers and general financial 
market participants, except bidders who sell on-the-run issues on debut-days (and who 
know the reasons behind the debut-day reselling activities). Second, _ plays a role of 
a noisy public signal.73 𝜖 is noisy because financial market participants (except bidders 
who sell on-the-run issues) do not know the exact motive behind the trade. On the 
other hand, as the transacted secondary market yields are publicly posted on the 
                                               
73 Noisy public signals play a substantial role in financial markets. See Morris and Shin (2002) and Allen, 
Morris, and Shin (2006) for models of noisy public signal information and coordinated reactions of 
financial market participants. 
96 
 
interbank market and other websites with bond IDs (but without the identities of the 
traders), every financial market participant can monitor 𝜖.74  Third, the homogenized 
margin captures informational revelation, especially related to trades with negative 
margins. Although general financial market participants (and researchers) know 
neither the economic incentives behind the negative margin trades, nor the identity of 
involved primary bidders, the negative margin trade itself reveals an urgent demand 
for liquidating the on-the-run issue. We will later test this information revelation 
hypothesis. 
As the residuals in Equation 4.1 by construction have a mean of zero, we subtract the 
mean market rate of return from the residuals to obtain the adjusted margin (Equation 
4.2). 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝜖𝑖𝑗?̂? − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛̂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                                                       (4.2) 
This is our noisy public signal measure of the adjusted margin, which is later used to 
investigate the informational channel of post-Treasury-auction market instability. 
Table 4.2 presents the estimated parameters and explains the market gap (i.e. return), 
as in Equation 4.1. In Column 1, we present results from the model that are estimated 
while excluding our financial market volatility and trend measures. This is our baseline 
model, to which we compare the sensitivity of parameters when re-estimated with 
market controls. Results indicate that floating coupon bonds reduce the margin 
compared to bonds without any coupons. The log number of bidders in an auction 
                                               
74 Specifically, such secondary market bond trade transaction information with bond IDs (but without 
identities) is officially posted on the websites of: China Foreign Exchange Trade System and National 
Interbank Funding Center (www.chinamoney.com.cn); Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(http://www.sse.com.cn); Shenzhen Stock Exchange (http://www.szse.cn), as well as commercial banks' 
websites. In addition, financial information companies (Bloomberg, Wind, etc.) post daily transaction 
data for their subscribers, who can obtain quotes from their terminals. 
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tends to induce aggressive bidding and increase the market gap, which is consistent 
with auction theory. Results indicate that, if the time lag between the primary and 
secondary market debut-day is longer, primarily due to public holidays, then this time 
lag tends to increase the margin. Additionally, the coefficient of the previous month's 
trading volume indicates that, if the trading intensity is high, then the margin is low, 
which is consistent with liquidity premium theories. Finally, the volatility, constructed 
using the previous five days' yield curve information at a given maturity, indicates that, 
if the market is volatile, then the margin is high. 
Considering other controls, we see that the Spanish or discriminatory auction methods 
do not affect the margin any differently than the uniform auction format. Securities 
with maturities beyond one year do not affect the market gap any differently than bills. 
In Column 2, we include the FTSE volatility as a control. The coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. In Column 3, we also include the yield curve difference (between auction 
and debut-days) to control for market trends. In Column 4, we also control for 
volatility of FTSE bank index at the day before the secondary market transaction. In 
Column 5, we include the variable that controls for money demand by institutions. The 
results indicate that the margin is not affected by the value of maturing bonds by 
institution for a given month. The main point is that, even after controlling for market 
conditions, our main bond- and auction-specific parameters stay consistent, including 
the coefficient of determination. 
Note that not all of the on-the-run bonds are resold on their debut-days. A concern one 
might have with these margin regressions is selection bias after controlling for 
covariates, and bonds that were traded are not randomly selected. Given that we 
observe all primary and debut-day secondary market transactions, we address this 
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concern by using a Heckman-based correction model. We specify the probability of 
selling on the first allowed trading day in the secondary market (the selection equation) 
using the same variables in the outcome equation given in Column 5 of Table 4.2, 
excluding trading location controls (Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange dummies). Because we do not have an exclusion restriction(s), we leverage 
the nonlinearity of the functional form of the selection equation. The estimates are 
presented in Column 6, and the results indicate that selection bias is not a concern. 
Next, we want to confirm whether the patterns we observe in the mean regression hold 
throughout the entire distribution of the margins. Therefore, we estimate the empirical 
model described in Column 5 of Table 4.2, using the quantile regression method 
proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1982). We report these results in Table 4.A.5 in 
Appendix 4.A. Qualitative interpretations of the coefficients are similar to what we 
observed in Table 4.4 and, hence, we do not discuss these results in detail. The main 
point is that the patterns discussed in the mean regression hold throughout the 
distribution of margins as well. 
However, in all models, the controls explain some variation, but not all. In Figure 4.3, 
we plot the fitted margins (from Equation 4.1) and adjusted margins (from Equation 
4.2). In the figure, we use predicted margins and residuals obtained after estimating 
the empirical model described in Column 5 in Table 4.2, and use them to construct the 
adjusted margins as described in Equation 4.2. Now, we compare the CDFs of fitted 
(un-adjusted) margins (Figure 4.2) with the adjusted margins (Figure 4.3). The natural 
question is whether one could still observe this negative return after removing the 
observable variation. Now, consider the distribution of the adjusted margin. Looking 
at Figure 4.3, we observe that, on average, the market generates positive returns 
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(adjusted margins). However, about 20% of transactions suffer losses. In Table 4.3, 
we present the distributional statistics of the adjusted margins with 95% confidence 
intervals. We observe that, at the bottom part of the distribution, negative values 
indicate the losses with statistical significance. 
In the above analysis, we do not control for secondary market volume, which may 
affect the secondary market rates. Our data set contains 1,128 secondary market debut 
transactions with volume information for non-reissued bonds. Note that the Wind data 
do not provide secondary transaction volumes for re-issued bonds and floating bonds. 
Next, we re-estimate the market gap regressions (Equation 4.1), previously seen in 
Table 4.2, with the control for the secondary market volume. These regression results 
are reported in Table 4.4 and they are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 
4.2.75 However, these data provide an opportunity to calculate the gains and losses for 
the volumes sold in the secondary market. 
In Table 4.5, we report the summary statistics for the gains and losses (positive and 
negative adjusted margins) based on regression results presented in Column 5 of Table 
4.4. We observe that there are 816 and 312 observations with positive and negative 
adjusted margins respectively. The average adjusted margin for positive values was 
0.060%, while the average negative adjusted margin was -0.082%. We also calculate 
the change in price between primary and secondary market debut transactions. For all 
the positive margins, the adjusted price change was 0.052. For the negative margins, 
it was -0.121. Given this information, we then calculate the average and total gains (or 
losses) for the traded instruments in the secondary market compared to the primary 
                                               
75 We have drawn the adjusted margins in the Appendix Figure A.4, which is also similar to Figure 3. 
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market. We observe that, for all positive adjusted margin transactions between 2004 
and 2016, the average gain per transaction was about ¥ 42.6 million, while the average 
loss was about ¥ 71.70 million for negative adjusted margin transactions. Even though 
the individual losses were higher than the gains, the total gains were ¥ 34.76 trillion 
(approximately $ 5.27 trillion) while the losses were ¥ 22.37 trillion (approximately 
$ 3.39 trillion). 
4.4.2 Adjusted margins by period 
Given our data span, we are in a unique position to examine the adjusted margins and 
the magnitude of losses during a financial crisis, as observed in 2008-2009. Here, we 
use the same predicted margins and residuals as the empirical model estimated in 
Column 5 in Table 4.2.76 However, we now construct the adjusted margins before, 
during, and after the crisis. These results are presented in Table 4.6. We also draw the 
CDF of these homogenized margins, and they are presented in Figure 4.4. 
The results indicate that, during the crisis years, the adjusted margins were negative and 
with higher magnitudes in the bottom half of the distribution, including the 50th 
percentile. This pattern was not observed before or after the financial crisis, indicating 
that bond losses were more prevalent during 2008-2009. However, after 2009, our 
results in Table 4.6 show that the adjusted profit margins have increased for primary 
dealers and this difference is statistically significant. 
In Table 4.7, we breakdown the gains and losses by period. The basic interpretation is 
similar to Table 4.5. However, during the 2008-2009 period, the average losses were 
                                               
76 We also estimate these models using dummies to indicate the crash and after-crash periods. These OLS 
and quantile models are presented in Table A.6 and Table 4.A.7 respectively. The results indicate that 
the market gaps were higher during and after the crash, compared to the time before the financial crisis. 
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about 2.8 times larger than the average gains. To be specific, during the financial crisis, 
the average gains were about U 45.90 million, while the average losses were ¥ 128 
million per transaction. 
Next, as we noticed, in Table 4.2, the market gap of the floating bonds are quite different 
from non-floating bonds. This may be due to the inherent structure of floating bonds. 
Hence, we re-estimate the models described in Equation 4.1, using only uniform bonds 
sold since 2007. Details of the analysis and regression results are presented in Appendix 
4.B. 
4.5 Liquidity constraints and bond losses 
Having defined bond losses, in this section, we examine whether we can predict bond 
losses when the financial market faces high money market borrowing costs, i.e., when 
the costs of intertemporal substitutions for alleviating current liquidity shortage are high. 
First, we identify secondary market transactions and days in which all traded bonds 
generated negative adjusted margins, and at least one transaction generated a loss that 
fell below the bottom 10th of the distribution. This explains the observation of a 
negative adjusted margin of 15.7%.77 We identify 52 days (out of 1,185 days) where all 
transactions incurred losses. This classification works as our most restrictive sample, 
and we later relax the cut-off threshold on these definitions of losses. We denote a 
transaction with a loss (loss = 1) and a day where all transaction incurred losses (all 
losses = 1). 
As represented by the Reuters' report, the best indicator of general liquidity in China is 
the seven-day REPO rate. Hence, we use the REPO rate as a proxy for liquidity 
                                               
77 Note that 78 transactions generated less than -15.7% returns. 
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constrains in China. A testable hypothesis is that when primary dealers face high 
borrowing-costs, which we use as a measurement of liquidity constraints, the primary 
dealers choose to generate cash using on-the-run bond sales. Hence, we examine 
whether we can use the REPO rate to predict bond losses, especially on trading days 
when all adjusted margins are negative. We also investigate the predictability of trading 
volume based on the REPO rate. 
First, at the transaction level, we use a simple probit to examine the probability of 
observing bond losses on trades given the REPO rate of the debut-day. We report these 
results in Table 4.8, Column 1 Panel A. Note that these losses are based on our adjusted 
margins, and hence they have been estimated after controlling for bond, auction, and 
market characteristics. The positive and significant coefficient of the REPO rate 
indicates that when the market observes a high REPO rate, there is a higher probability 
of observing bond losses in the secondary market. In Column 2, we report the results 
for auctions with available records of secondary market volumes. The results are similar 
to what we observe in Column 1. Next in Column 3, we examine a different construction 
of the dependent variable, which is equal to one on a debut-day when all adjusted 
margins are negative, and otherwise zero. Our probit results indicate that when the 
REPO rate is high on a given day, then there is a higher probability that all secondary 
market transactions are losses on that day. 
Next we examine whether the traded volume is affected by the REPO rate, at both 
transaction and debut-day levels. Here our dependent variable is either (i) secondary 
market traded volume by bond (in logs), compared to its primary market auctioned 
volume (in logs), or (ii) the total secondary market volume of all bonds for a given 
trading day (in logs), compared to these bonds' total primary market volume (in logs). 
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In Columns 4 and 5 we report these results estimated using OLS. Both columns indicate 
that when liquidity constrains are tighter, secondary market trading volumes are higher, 
compared to low liquidation cost days. It is possible that our results from this analysis 
are driven by the market crash in 2008 and 2009. Hence, we re-estimate these models 
without bond transactions between 2008 and 2009. These results are presented in Panel 
B. The results indicate that our findings are not sensitive to the market crash, and are 
thus robust. 
Next we reduce our loss threshold to 10% and re-estimate all models. Our general 
qualitative results are similar, indicating that they are robust to different thresholds of 
losses as well. We do not report these results, but they are available upon request. 
4.6 Bond losses and financial stability 
Now we turn our attention to the effect of bond losses on financial instability by 
analysing what happened to the FTSE Russel Chinese financial indexes -consisting of 
representative bank, security, and insurance sector public companies –on the days when 
Chinese primary market dealers suffered substantial bond losses. As we mentioned 
earlier, the FTSE Chinese financial indexes provide broad coverage of the Chinese stock 
market and financial institutions. Hence, any movement on these indexes reveals 
information about the financial health of banks and insurance companies in China. We 
exploit the fact that more than 90 percent of financial institutions that represent the 
FTSE banking, security, and insurance indexes are also primary dealers. In Table 4.A.8, 




By investigating the effect of bond losses on Chinese financial indexes, we hypothesize 
that, if primary dealers are exposed to bond losses on a secondary market debut-day, 
then their market capitalization value could decline, lowering the FTSE financial 
indexes. To test this informational hypothesis, we conduct the following empirical 
exercise. 
First, as above, we use secondary market debut-days with at least one transaction where 
the adjusted margins fall below the bottom 10th (-15.7%) of the distribution. Next, we 
drop all secondary market dates where we observe both positive and negative adjusted 
margin transactions. This condition drops 121 secondary market dates with 454 
transactions. This gives us a sample of 1,064 secondary market debut-dates, which 
consist of transactions with either all positive (1,606) or all negative (313) adjusted 
margins. As in the liquidity constraint exercise, we identify days where all transactions 
were negative (52) with at least one transaction generating adjusted margins at or below 
the 10th percentile of the distribution. Next, we create a balanced panel for the 1,917 
secondary transactions involving banking and security indexes, using data from two 
days prior and two days after the secondary market debut date. This creates a sample of 
9,585 observations. Using this data, we estimate the following simple panel regression 
model, similar to a difference-in-difference (event study) model, to examine the impact 
of bond losses on the financial sector as 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑖 × 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (4.3) 
where I is the banking or security index at time t based on 𝑖𝑡ℎ bond transaction, N is an 
indicator to identify all negative adjusted margin transactions with the corresponding 




We are primarily interested in the value of the coefficient of 𝛽3 which measures the 
difference in indexes between the days with all negative adjusted margin transactions 
and days with all positive ones. We present the results for the banking index of this 
exercise in Table 4.9, Panel A. Note that all +/- day indexes values are normalized by 
the corresponding secondary market trading day value. 
We estimate the above model with a plus-minus one day time span, as well as with a 
plus-minus two days span. Further, we estimate these models without years 2008 and 
2009. The results indicate that banking index fell by about 0.6-0.8 percent following 
days with bond losses. These panel regression results support our hypothesis that bond 
losses could lead to financial market instability, at least in (but not limited to) the 
financial sectors' capitalization values. Similar patterns are observed for the security 
index (See Panel B in Table 4.9). Next, we estimate a similar model where the 
dependent variable is the REPO rate, normalized by the debut date value. The 
coefficient of interest, 𝛽3, indicates that the REPO rate is not responsive to the observed 
bond losses (Panel C in Table 4.9). This result further support our hypotheses that 
financial indexes respond to bank losses, while money market rates do not.78 
4.7 Auction mechanisms and bond losses 
In the previous section, we demonstrated that bond losses are prevalent in bond 
markets, and that such losses generate a drop in the entire Chinese banking sector's 
stock capitalization value. A government that cares about financial stability may 
consider all available policy instruments to stabilize the market. In the context of the 
financial bond market, the government, as a bond issuer, can use different auction 
                                               
78 As in our `liquidity constraints' exercise, we re-estimate these models using a 10% cut-off for the 




mechanisms to reduce bond losses. However, there is no clear policy recommendation, 
based on the empirical and/or theoretical literature, about which mechanism should be 
used for this purpose.79 
In this section, we evaluate which auction mechanism best mitigates bond losses in the 
market. China, again, is the perfect ground to investigate this question. During the 
period May 2012-July 2014 for the CDB, and July 2013-May 2015 for the EIB, these 
two institutions conducted alternating auction rule market based experiment to sell 
bonds using discriminatory and uniform-pricing auction formats. As the use of the 
different auction mechanisms was experimented, we can estimate the effect of the 
adoption of the discriminatory and uniform auctions on the distribution of the adjusted 
margin. Our results suggest that bidders are more exposed to bond losses in 
discriminatory auctions than in uniform-price auctions. 
4.7.1 Alternating auction rule experiment 
Throughout the experiment period, the CDB held weekly auctions on Tuesdays, while 
the EIB held their auctions mostly on Thursdays or Fridays. Note that, in the early parts 
of the sample, the EIB held auctions fortnightly or monthly while, later, they held 
weekly auctions. Within each week, the CDB sold 2 to 5 different maturities of bonds 
in separate auctions, and the EIB followed a similar pattern. A representative pattern of 
their alternating experimental auction format choices are as follows: 
Each week, the CDB auctioned o_ bonds with maturity lengths of 3, 5, and 7 years. 
However, as shown in Table 4.A.9, each week they alternated the auction mechanism 
                                               
79 See Bikhchandani and Huang (1993), Mester (1995), and Kastl (2017) for a survey of the literature 
on the economics of Treasury security auctions. 
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between the discriminatory and uniform formats. The CDB repeated this pattern of 
alternating auction rules between May 2012 and July 2014.80 The EIB also implemented 
a similar experiment design with the alternation of uniform- and discriminatory- auction 
formats. As shown in Table 4.A.10 Panel A, in the early part of their experiment, the 
EIB alternated between auction formats every two or three months. In the second half 
of the experiment, the EIB alternated the auction format for the same type of bond 
(identified by bond ID and initial and reissue status). We note this market 
experimentation for two bonds in Table 4.A.10 Panel B. 
We observe 348 auctions during this experimental period. Out of these, 160 auctions 
were held using the discriminatory auction format. The CDB held 269 auctions and 130 
of them were using discriminatory auction format while 139 were sold using uniform 
auctions format. The EIB used 30 and 49 discriminatory and uniform auctions 
respectively. Accordingly, we exploit this experimental alternation between auction 
formats a source of exogenous variation. The total value of the experiment is ¥ 1.96 
trillion (approximately $ 291 billion).81 
An important feature of experiment conducted by the CDB and EIB is that bidders 
know the format of a given auction only five days before it occurs. This means that, 
when they are participating in a typical auction, they do not know the format of the 
upcoming auctions. This is an important feature of the experiment, as bidders will not 
                                               
80 Note that all bills (with maturities of less than or equal to one year) and bonds (with maturities equal 
to or more than 10 years) were sold using the uniform auction format. 
81 Barbosa et al. (2018) show that, during the experiment period, the value of the market yield the day 
before the primary market, secondary market volatility, and the value of maturing bonds by the institution 
for a given month are not statistically different between the uniform and discriminatory format. Barbosa 




be able to time their entry into the auction based on the format of the auction that is 
coming up next. 
Given this setting, we re-estimate our models (as in Equations 4.1 and 4.2) for this 
period. OLS and quantile results are presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.A.11.82  Although 
we do not see a difference in market gap between uniform and discriminatory auction 
formats during this period, our main interest is the adjusted margins. We obtain 
adjusted margins for this period without controlling for auction mechanisms. In Figure 
4.7, we plot these adjusted margins by uniform and discriminatory auction formats. 
Figure 4.7 reveals that the share of transactions with a negative adjusted margin is 
higher in discriminatory auctions than in uniform ones. It also shows that the 
distribution of adjusted margins for uniform auctions are higher than the adjusted 
margins of discriminatory auctions. The result of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reports 
that the hypothesis of distributional equivalence is rejected at the p-value of less than 
0.01.83 Table 4.11 supports the evidence provided in Figure 4.7 and indicates that the 
margins generated from uniform auctions are larger than the margins generated from 
discriminatory auctions.84 
Next, we also re-estimate the market gap (Equation 4.1) controlling for volume. We 
have only 74 observations (out of 348) with volume records during the experimental 
                                               
82 We do not estimate this using a Heckman model, as more than 94% (328 out of 348) of bonds sold in 
primary market auctions during this experiment period had experienced secondary market sales on their 
debut days. 
83 We further investigate the Goldman-Kaplan point-by-point equivalence test (Goldman and Kaplan 
2018) shows that, with a familywise error rate at a 5% level, the CDF equivalence is rejected in the ranges 
of [-0.013, -0.0124], [-0.012, -0.008], [0.007, 0.019], and [0.039, 0.869]. 
84 However, one may argue that margins in discriminatory auctions may be different for a given bond 
based on the highest and lowest accepted primary rates they observe. To address this concern, we 
construct margins using high and low primary bids. The margins regression is presented in Table 4.A.12 
in the Appendix 4.A. Table 4.A.13 and Figure 4.A.5 present adjusted margins that have been constructed 
by using high, low, and weighted average winning primary 
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period. However, our results indicate that the basic findings are similar to the ones we 
find in Table 4.4.85 In this exercise, we also calculate the average gains and losses. 
With respect to uniform auctions, we observe that the average gain per transaction--
based on 33 positive adjusted margins--was ¥ 5.10 million while the average loss was 
¥ 3.34 million based on 10 negative adjusted margin transactions. When considering 
discriminatory auctions, the average gain per auction is ¥ 8.60 million (25 transactions 
with positive adjusted margins) while the average loss was ¥ 15.78 million (6 
transactions with negative adjusted margins). 
4.7.2 Policy Implications 
The above results indicate that, if a government wishes to stabilize the financial sector, 
it could adopt uniform auctions that lead to a lower probability of bond losses. However, 
the government may have other objectives that may conflict with mitigating bond losses. 
For instance, the uniform format could potentially reduce revenues to the government. 
Barbosa et al. (2019) show that there is no difference in the primary market auction 
outcomes between discriminatory and uniform auction methods using the same Chinese 
experimental data. Therefore, from the point of view of a government's revenue, the two 
auction mechanisms generate the desired funds with statistically indistinguishable yield 
rates. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this study, we show that the existence of bond losses is prevalent in bond markets 
in post-Treasury auction periods. We exploit the market structure of the Chinese 
government security issuance process, where short trades are strictly prohibited, which 
                                               
85 We do not report these results but can provide upon request. 
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allows us to focus on an analysis of potential liquidity constraints. By computing the 
difference between the primary market yield in bond auctions and its respective 
secondary market yield from resale market transactions, we obtain the effective return 
(adjusted margin) of a primary bond dealer, which has a straightforward interpretation. 
Using a unique data set containing the transactions of bonds in the primary and 
secondary markets, we show the prevalence of bond losses even after adjusting for 
auction, bond, and market conditions. Next, we show that tight liquidity conditions, 
proxied by REPO rates in the money market, are a source of bond losses. Also, we 
finds that bond losses are related to the decline in capitalization values, measured by 
FTSE index. Importantly, we also find that market indexes fall after observing bond 
losses, clarifying the informational channel through which financial market instability 
propagates. 
Finally, we determine which auction mechanism (uniform vs. discriminatory) best 
mitigates these bond losses, using an alternating market-based experiment conducted 
by two Chinese government bond issuers. We find that the share of transactions with 
bond losses is higher in discriminatory auctions than in uniform ones. Also, the results 
show that the dealers' average expected returns are lower in discriminatory auctions. 
This may support the discontinuation of discriminatory auctions since 2016 by 
Chinese bond issuers, as well as the global trend of switching from the discriminatory 
to the uniform format. Thus, our finding of auction-rule effect could be informative to 







4.9 Figures and Tables 
Figure 4.1: Primary dealer overlap 
 
Notes: In this figure, we show the overlapping nature across the four bond-issuing institutions. 
During the period 2004- 2017, about 50 percent of primary dealers submitted their bids in all 
MOF, CDB, EIB, and ADB auctions. Moreover, around 25 percent of primary dealers submitted 











Figure 4.2: Raw margin 
 
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the raw margin. We define the 
margin for a given bond as the primary minus secondary market rates. This distribution is not 













Figure 4.3: Adjusted margin 
 
Notes: In this figure, we plot the CDF of fitted margins (From Equation 4.1) and adjusted 
margins (From Equation 4.2). Here, we use predicted margins and residuals obtained after 
estimating the empirical model described in Column 5 in Table 2. Then we use them to construct 













Figure 4.4: Adjusted margins by period 
 
Notes: In this figure, we plot the CDF of adjusted margins before, during, and after the 2008-
2009 crisis. We use predicted margins and residuals obtained after estimating the empirical 













Figure 4.5: Adjusted margins for floating and non-floating bonds 
 
Notes: In this figure, we show the CDF of adjusted margins by bond type. Note that floating 













Figure 4.6: Adjusted margins for floating bonds using spreads 
 
Notes: In this figure, we show the adjusted margin using the spread for floating bonds. There 
were 168 floating bonds during our sample period. The detailed description of the spread 














Figure 4.7: Adjusted margins for uniform and discriminatory auctions during 
randomized 
 
Notes: In this figure, we plot the CDF of adjusted margins for uniform and discriminatory 
auction formats during the alternating-rule experiment period. The alternating-rule experiment 











Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean / Counts 
Panel A 
Number of bonds sold in the secondary market 2,371 
Number of bonds sold through Hybrid Auctions (HA) 565 
Number of bonds sold through Discriminatory Auctions (DA) 285 
Number of bonds sold through Uniform Auctions (UA) 1,521 
Average primary market rate (in percentage) 3.628 
(0.951) 
Number of Bills 572 
Number of Notes 1,357 
Number of Bonds 442 
Number of Floating Bonds 168 
Number of bidders 43.762 
(11.205) 
Panel B 
Average secondary market rate (in percentage) 3.750 
(0.962) 
Number of transactions in the Inter-Bank Market 2,213 
Number of transactions in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 99 
Number of transactions in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 59 
Time lag (in calendar days) 8.522 
(4.681) 





Volatility of FTSE bank index before a secondary market debut day 0.017 
(0.011) 
REPO rate (in percentage) 3.062 
(1.131) 
Government yield gap between a primary auction date and a day before the 
secondary market (in percentage) 
-0.003 
(0.093) 
Value of maturing bonds by institution for a given month (in ¥ 100,000) 2,823,731.00 
(3,270,008.00) 
This table reports summary statistics of data used in the analysis between 2014 and 2017. Panel 
A reports summary statistics for auction-level characteristics: auction formats, bond categories, 
floating bond and bidders’ number per auction. 2371 auctions are matched with secondary 
market information. Panel B reports secondary market statistics and variables: list location, time 
lags and monthly traded volume. Panel C reports other variables, including those capture 
possible changes in market conditions between auction and secondary market debut days. 







Table 4.2: Regression results for market gap 
Variable Primary rate – secondary rate 
OLS Heckman 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 


















































































































































Volatility of FTSE bank index at 











Government yield gap between 
primary auction date and the day 










Log value of maturing bonds by 
institution for a given month 





Selection       
λ 
     
0.025 
(0.062) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 
𝑅2 0.182 0.182 0.183 0.183 0.183  
Wald 𝑋2      529.890 
This table presents the estimated parameters and explains the market gap (margin), as in Equation 4.1. We define the 
margin for a given bond as the primary minus secondary market rates. HA is an indicator equalling to one if the 
auction format is the hybrid auction. DA is an indicator equalling to one if the auction format is the discriminatory 
auction. Fixed coupon bond equals to one if the bond coupon payment is fixed. Floating coupon bond equals to one 
if the bond coupon payment is float. Notes equals to one if the bonds’ maturity is between one year and ten year. 
Bonds is an indicator equalling one when bonds’ maturities are more than ten year. Log number of bidders is nature 
logarithm of number of bidders. Both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are indicators of 
listing locations where bonds trading in the secondary market. Log of days between primary and secondary market 
is nature logarithm of time gap between two markets. Log of trading volume in the previous month is nature logarithm 
monthly trading volume one month prior to auctions. Volatility is calculated using the five-day daily government 
announced yield before secondary debut days. Volatility if FTSE bank index at the day before secondary market is 
constructed using the five-day FTSE China bank index one day prior to secondary initial trading days. Government 
yield gap between primary auction date and the day before secondary market is using the government daily yield at 
auction day minus the government yield one day before the secondary listing day. Log value of maturing bonds by 
institution for a given month is the nature logarithm of monthly maturing bond in the same month as the auction days. 
The OLS results are presented in first five columns. As we have primary and secondary market debut day records 
(including the records of no debut-day transactions), this table also report the Heckman-based correction model, 
presented in Column 6. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 





















































































































































































































































Table 4.4: Regression results for market gap with volume 
Variable Primary rate – secondary rate 
OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






































































Log of days between 


































Volatility of FTSE bank 










Government yield gap 
between primary auction 









Log value of maturing bonds 
by institution for a given 
month 
    
0.001 
(0.001) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128 1,128 
𝑅2 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.052 0.052 
This table presents the estimated parameters and explains the market gap (margin), as 
in Equation 4.1. We define the margin for a given bond as the primary minus secondary 
market rates. Note, Log of volume is the nature logarithm of total volume of bonds 
which are traded in the secondary initial days. The OLS results are presented in the five 
columns. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.8: Effect of REPO rate on adjusted margins and volume 
Variables Probability of observing losses Log of volume 
All trades With volume Trading day By trade Total per day 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: All years 

















Log of total initial 
volume 




Observations 2,371 1,128 1,185 1,128 877 
Loglikelihood 17.20 8.618 50.63   
R-squared    0.301 0.201 
Panel B: Without 2008-2009 

















Log of total initial 
volume 




Observations 2,190 983 1,039 983 752 
Loglikelihood -414.9 -69.14 -202.7   
R-squared    0.302 0.199 
This table reports the effect of REPO rate on observing bond losses and trading volume for all 
years and years excluding 2008 and 2009 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. A simple probit 
estimations are employed in the first three column, examining the probability of observing bond 
losses on trades given the REPO rate of the debut-day. All margins are adjusted margins. All 
trades is indicator equally one if the transaction suffers the loss. With volume records the 
transaction with volume information. It equals to one if the transaction obtains the negative 
margins. Trading day equals to 1 if all transactions in that day collect negative margins. 
Otherwise, it equals to 0. The Column 4 and 5 use the OLS estimations, examining the effects 
of REPO rate affect the trading volume. Log of Volume by trade (Column 4) is log of secondary 
market trading volume over log of total primary market auctioned volume. Log of Volume total 
per day (Column 5) is log of total market trading volume over log of total primary market 
auctioned volume in a given day. REPO rate is Chinese seven-day repo rates which are daily 
announced. Log of initial volume is nature logarithm of trading volume in _rst debut-day. Log 
of total initial volume is nature logarithm of total trading volume in a given day. Robust standard 







Table 4.9: Bank and security index variation 
Variables All years Without 2008-2009 
+/- One day +/- Two days +/- One day +/- Two days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Bank index 
















Negative adjusted margin trades × 










Observations 5,742 9,570 5,217 8,695 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Panel B: Security index 
















Negative adjusted margin trades × 










Observations 5,751 9,585 5,226 8,710 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel C: REPO rate 
















Negative adjusted margin trades × 










Observations 5,742 9,570 5,217 8,695 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
This table reports results for the panel regression (event study) model to examine the impact of 
bond losses on the financial sector. The first two columns report results for all years, while the 
last two columns report results without 2008 and 2009. We are interested in the value of the 
coefficient of  𝛽3 , which measures the di_erence in China FTSE indexes (Bank, Security, 
Insurance) that occurs after the secondary market trades (one or two days) on all negative 
adjusted margin transaction days compared to all positive days. Robust standard errors are in 






Table 4.10: Regression results for market gap during the alternating-rule experiment 
Variable Primary rate -secondary rate 

































Lag of days between 












Log of trading volume on 






















Volatility of FTSE bank 










Government yield gap 
between primary auction 









Log value of maturing 
bonds by institution for a 
given month 
    
0.007 
(0.010) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 348 348 348 348 348 
𝑅2 0.553 0.559 0.553 0.560 0.560 
This table reports the OLS results for the market gap between uniform and discriminatory 
auction formats during the alternating experiment period. All explanatory variables are similar 
as Table 4.2. Two policy banks, CDB and EIB, conducted auction experiment from 2012 to 
2015. The experiment period of CDB is between May 2012 and July 2014, while the experiment 
period of EIB is between July 2013 and May 2015. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 


























































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4.A Extra figures and tables 
Figure 4.A.1: Registered primary dealers 
 
 
Notes: In this figure, we show the number of prequalified (primary) dealers by 
institution from 2004 to 2017. Panel A presents the statistics for the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), Panel B for the Agriculture Development Bank (ADB), Panel C for 




Figure 4.A.2: Ratios of incumbents and entrants 
 
Notes: In this figure, we plot the ratio of entrants and incumbents for each institution from 2004 
to 2017. The ratio of entrants equals the entrants divided by total number of bidders in each 
year. The ratio of incumbents equals the incumbents divided by total number of bidders in each 
year. Entrants are primary dealers who first time to participate bond auctions in the specific 
institution. Incumbents are primary dealers who participate bond auctions in the institution at 
least once before. Notably, the ratio of entrants and incumbents is obtained based on statistics 
in 2013 for MOF, ADB and CDB. Note that the ADB started selling bonds in 2004 and hence 









Figure 4.A.3: The number of continuing primary dealers 
 
Notes: In this figure, we plot the year-to-year continuing incumbents for each institution from 
2004 to 2017. Note that the continuing incumbents are primary dealers who are authorised by 
bond issuers as members to participate bond auctions every year during 2004 to 2017. Because 
ADB used auction since 2004, the continuing incumbents are collected from 2005. More than 
90 percent of bidders continue from the previous year and more than 50 percent of bidders who 











Figure 4.A.4: Adjusted margins while controlling for volume 
 
Notes: In this figure, we show the CDF of adjusted margins while controlling for volume. Note 














Figure 4.A.5: Margins for discriminatory auctions 
 
Notes: This figure presents CDF of adjusted margins that have been constructed by using the 
highest, lowest, and weighted average winning primary rates in discriminatory auctions. Since 
dealers need to pay what they bid in discriminatory auctions, one may argue that margins in 
discriminatory auctions may be different for a given bond based on the highest and lowest 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.A.5: Quantile regression results for market gap 
Variable Primary rate - secondary rate 
Quantile 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 




























































































































Volatility of FTSE bank index at 











Government yield gap between 
primary auction date and the day 











Log value of maturing bonds by 











Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 
R2 0.341 0.236 0.078 0.080 0.222 
This table presents results for margins using the quantile regression method proposed by 
Koenker and Bassett (1982) based on the empirical model described in Column 5 of Table 2. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 








Table 4.A.6: Regression results for market gap by period 
Variable Primary rate -secondary rate 
OLS Heckman 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












































































































































Log of days between primary 








































Volatility of FTSE bank 










Government yield gap 
between primary auction date 
and the day before the 
secondary market 








Log value of maturing bonds 
by institution for a given 
month 




Selection       
⋋ 
     -0.009 
(0.026) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 
𝑅2 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123  
Wald 𝑋2      292.47 
This table displays the regression results for adjusted margins before, during and after the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, based on the empirical model described in corresponding columns of Table 2. Notable, 
in the Heckman estimation, the indictor of fixed coupon bonds is excluded, compared to Column 6 of 
Table 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 






Table 4. A.7: Quantile regression results for market gap by period 
Variable Primary rate -secondary rate 
Quantile 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
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Government yield gap between 
primary auction date and the 











Log value of maturing bonds by 











Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 2,371 
𝑅2 0.341 0.236 0.078 0.080 0.222 
This table shows the distributional estimation results of adjusted margins by period: before, 
during and after financial crisis. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 




Table 4.A.8: FTSE index institutions and the primary market dealers 
Variable FTSE Index 
Bank Security Insurance 
Total number of institutions in the FTSE index 23 33 4 
FTSE index institutions as MOF primary dealers 22 (96%) 26 (79%) 4 (100%) 
FTSE index institutions as ADB primary dealers 21 (91%) 24 (73%) 1 (25%) 
FTSE index institutions as CDB primary dealers 22 (96%) 28 (85%) 4 (100%) 
FTSE index institutions as EIB primary dealers 20 (87%) 21 (64%) 3 (75%) 
This table presents a breakdown of the number of primary banks that represent the FTSE indexes. 
Percentages are in parentheses, calculating by FTSE index institutions in each bond issuer (MOF, ADB, 
CDB, EIB) divided by total number if institutions in the corresponding FTSE indexes. 
 
Table 4.A.9: Example of alternating pattern for the CDB 
Date Maturity (in years) Auction mechanism 
Jan 08, 2013 3, 5, 7 Discriminatory 
Jan 15, 2013 3, 5, 7 Uniform 
Jan 22, 2013 5, 7 Discriminatory 
Jan 29, 2013 3, 5, 7 Uniform 
Feb 05, 2013 3, 5, 7 Discriminatory 
Feb 19, 2013 3, 5, 7 Uniform 
Apr 09, 2013 3, 7 Discriminatory 
Apr 16, 2013 3, 7 Uniform 
Apr 23, 2013 3, 7 Discriminatory 
May 07, 2013 3, 7 Uniform 
May 14, 2013 3, 7 Discriminatory 
May 21, 2013 3, 5, 7 Discriminatory 
Jul 23, 2013 3, 5, 7 Uniform 
Jul 30, 2013 3, 5, 7 Discriminatory 
This table shows the CDB repeated pattern of alternation auction rules during the experiment period. 
Note that all bills (maturity less than or equal to one year) and bonds (maturity equal or more than 10 
years) were sold using the uniform auction format. The alternating-rule experiment period for CDB was 






Table 4.A.10: Example of alternating pattern for the EIB 
Date Bond ID Maturity (in years) Auction mechanism 
Panel A: Experimentation by date 
Jul 31, 2013  2(t) Discriminatory 
Aug 15, 2013  2(t) Discriminatory 
Sep 24, 2013  2(t) Discriminatory 
Oct 21, 2013  2(t) Uniform 
Nov 04, 2013  2(t) Uniform 
Apr 11, 2014  3(t) Discriminatory 
May 15, 2014  3(t) Uniform 
May 23, 2014  3(t) Discriminatory 
Jun 06, 2014  3(t) Uniform 
Panel B: Experimentation by bond 
Nov 28, 2014 14 EXIM 78 (initial) 2 Discriminatory 
Dec 04, 2014 14 EXIM 78 (reissue) 2 Uniform 
Dec 17, 2014 14 EXIM 78 (reissue) 2 Discriminatory 
Apr 15, 2015 15 EXIM 09 (initial) 3 Uniform 
Apr 24, 2015 15 EXIM 09 (reissue) 3 Uniform 
Apr 30, 2015 15 EXIM 09 (reissue) 3 Uniform 
May 06, 2015 15 EXIM 09 (reissue) 3 Discriminatory 
May 13, 2015 15 EXIM 09 (reissue) 3 Discriminatory 
May 21, 20 15 EXIM 09 (reissue) 3 Discriminatory 
This table shows the EIB pattern of alternation auction rules during the experiment period. The 
alternating-rule experiment period for the EIB was from July 2013 to May 2015. Panel A, we 
show the early part of experimental pattern by date. In Panel B, we show the second half of 
experimental pattern. Notably, EIB alternated the auction formats for the same type of bonds 
(identified by bond ID and initial and reissue status). Each reissued bond has a new id and an 








Table 4.A.11: Quantile regression results for market gap during the alternating experiment 
Variable Primary rate - secondary rate 
Quantile 
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Volatility of FTSE bank index at 











Government yield gap between 
the primary auction date and the 











Log value of maturing bonds by 











Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 348 348 348 348 348 
𝑅2 0.575 0.475 0.312 0.240 0.331 
This table reports the quantile regression results for the market gap between uniform and 
discriminatory auction formats during the alternating-rule experiment period. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 











Table 4.A.12: Regression results for market gap using discriminatory auctions 
Variable Primary rate - secondary rate 
Highest Lowest Weighted avg. 





















































Volatility of FTSE bank index at the day 







Government yield gap between primary 








Log value of maturing bonds by institution 







Institution effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 285 285 285 
𝑅2 0.370 0.430 0.376 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 











Table 4.A.13: Adjusted margins for discriminatory auctions 
Variable Percentile 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Highest primary 












of the primary 























This table reports the distributional adjusted margins in discriminatory auctions by the highest, 



















Appendix 4.B: Adjusted margins by bond types 
In this Appendix, we report the adjusted margins for floating bonds. Floating bonds 
were introduced to the Chinese bond market in 2007 and were sold using only the 
uniform auction format. In this subsection, we analyse the models described in Equation 
4.1 using only uniform bonds sold since 2007. The regression results are presented in 
Table B.1, and the general conclusions are qualitative the same. 
Next, to obtain our adjusted measure of margin for floating and non-floating bonds, we 
estimate the models described in Equation 1 without the bond-type dummies for the 
selected sample. In Figure 4.B.1, we show the adjusted margins by bond type. As we 
can see, floating bonds tend to have a higher rate of bond losses. Table B.3 reports the 
adjusted margins by bond type for selected percentiles. While floating bonds make large 
negative adjusted margins, they also make large positive adjusted margins - twice in 
magnitude - compared to non-floating bonds. 
One might consider why there are large tails for floating bonds. The returns of the 
floating bonds are tied to market conditions, while non-floating bonds are 
predetermined.86 Hence, we argue that the difference in spreads in the primary and 
secondary market is a better measure of the margin for floating bonds. 
Obtaining the spread is a challenging task, as it is not readily available for bonds traded 
in the secondary market. Hence, one could consider the following method to compute 
the spread. Based on the forward curve of the money market reference (e.g., deposit 
                                               
86 Note that, in floating bonds, bidders bid for the spread. In these floating bonds, the effective return is 
the indexed interest rate - London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate 




rate, LIBOR, SHIBOR, China Inter-Bank Offer Rate [CHIBOR]) of each floating bond, 
we compute its expected cash-flow payment at the secondary market trading date. That 
information, combined with the secondary market yield rate of that floating bond, 
allows us to obtain the implicit spread for every floating bond transacted in the 
secondary market. 
First, we estimate our standard set of empirical models with relevant variables for the 
floating bond sample of 168. These results are presented in Table 4.B.2. Compared to 
short-term bills, bonds and notes have a smaller margin. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
the volatility of the bank index indicates larger, as the variation of the FTSE index 
increases. Using estimates from Column 5 in Table 4.B.2, we construct the adjusted 
margins for the floating bonds.87 In Figure 4.B.2, we show the adjusted margins using 
the spread for floating bonds. We see that about 40 percent of them still face bond losses. 
To be complete, in Table 4.B.3, we show the distribution of the adjusted margins 






                                               
87 All floating bonds were sold in the secondary market and, hence, no selection model is estimated. 
88 We do not compare the floating and non-floating bonds' gains and losses as we do not have the 




Figure 4.B.1: Adjusted margins for floating and non-floating bonds 
 
In this figure, we show the CDF of adjusted margins by bond type. Note that floating bonds were sold 










Figure 4.B.2: Adjusted margins for floating bonds using spreads 
 
In this figure, we show the CDF of adjusted margins for 168 floating bonds, based on Column 











Table 4.B.1: Regression results for uniform floating and other bonds' market gap 
Variable Primary rate - secondary rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Volatility of FTSE bank 










Government yield gap 
between primary auction 









Log value of maturing 
bonds by institution for a 
given month 
    
0.000 
(0.002) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442 
𝑅2 0.199 0.199 0.200 0.200 0.200 
This table presents the OLS results for margins by bond types - floating and non-floating bonds, based 
on the empirical model described in Equation 4.1. The floating bond were introduced since 2007 and 
hence estimations in this tables are based on bond trading information from 2007 to 2017. Robust 









Table 4.B.2: Regression results for floating bonds' difference in spread 
Variable Difference in primary and secondary market spread 
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Government yield gap 
between primary auction 









Log value of maturing 
bonds by institution for a 
given month 
    
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Institution effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 
𝑅2 0.626 0.644 0.626 0.647 0.200 
This table presents the OLS results for margins by floating bonds. The returns of the floating bonds are 
tied to market conditions, while non-floating bonds are predetermined. All floating bonds were sold by 
uniform auctions. Hence, we use the difference in spreads in the primary and secondary market as a 
measure of the margin for floating bonds. To obtain the implicit spreads, we first compute the expected 
case-ow payment yields basing on the forward curve of market reference rates. Then these expected 
yields are considered as the secondary market yield to compute the margins. Robust standard errors are 






Table 4.B.3: Adjusted margins by bond type 
Variable Percentile 























This table reports the adjusted margins by bond type for selected percentiles. Note that, to obtain our 
adjusted measure of margin for floating and non-floating bonds, we estimate the models described in 
Equation 4.1 without the bond-type dummies for the selected sample. 95% confidence intervals are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 4.B.4: Adjusted margins for floating bonds using spread 
Variable Percentile 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 










In this table, we report the distributional statistics of the adjusted margins constructed by spread with 95% 
















5.1 Conclusion Remark 
The bond market is one of the main financial markets, which plays a significantly role 
in any national economy. In most market economy countries, government policy makers 
use bonds as an important macro-economic tool, to adjust domestic economy and 
privatise state owned assets. Both participants in bond markets may suffer losses and 
financial market instability if they do not adopt proper issuing formats. This highlights 
the importance of considering various issuance mechanisms. 
In this dissertation, I analyse the Chinese bond market, which is the third largest in the 
world. In Chapter 2, I examine revenue ranking of bonds issued using uniform auctions 
and book building. I used data from Chinese local government bonds. Differences in 
revenue between uniform auctions and book buildings are considered across three 
revenue measurements: primary rates and two normalized yield rates. Results show that 
book building leads to a higher yield, which lowers the bond issuers' revenue. 
Furthermore, a Heckman model is used to address the potential selection bias and 
endogenous problems. Results from estimates support the conclusion from OLS 
approaches: uniform auctions generate more revenue than book building. Therefore, 
this study provides empirical evidence to policy makers in support of uniform auctions. 




In Chapter 3, we compare revenue ranking of bonds issued using discriminatory and 
uniform auction formats. Here we use auction data from CDB and EIB where they 
conducted a market experiment between 2012 and 2015. Results show no statistical 
difference in revenue between discriminatory auctions and uniform auctions, based on 
more than 300 observations. Furthermore, results suggest that bidders do not have a 
preference for either type of auction. These findings are supporting by previous 
literature, using market experiment data. 
In Chapter 4, this study addresses three objectives and analyses discriminatory auctions 
and uniform auctions from bond losses perspectives. Firstly, the prevalence of 
government bond losses in post-auction periods are analysed, by constructing gaps 
between the primary market rate and secondary market rate. There are about 20% bond 
losses exists in the bond market and this proportion rises during the financial crisis. 
Next, the market mechanism which leads to bond losses is explored. REPO rates in the 
money market are used as the proxy of liquidity constraint for banks. The probability 
of banks selling their bonds at a loss to release their liquidity pressure when they face 
the high borrowing cost in the money market is examined. Results show that liquidity 
constraint is one of the major leading causes of bond losses. Furthermore, the FTSE 
index falls after bond losses, suggesting a positive correlation between bond losses and 
financial market instability. Based on an alternating market-based experiment 
conducted by CDB and EIB, this study finds that uniform auctions can mitigates bond 
losses better than discriminatory auctions. This finding may help explain why Chinese 
bond issuers have stopped using discriminatory auctions since 2016. This finding also 
helps explain why discriminatory auctions are driven out by uniform auction in the 
global trend. This dissertation provides insights to policy makers regarding different 
issuing mechanisms for bond issuers. Uniform auctions generate more revenue to bond 
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issuers compared with book building, while uniform auctions do not generate more 
revenue than discriminatory auctions. However, uniform auctions stabilize the financial 
market by reducing bond losses. Based on these finding, this thesis recommends that 
policy makers use uniform auctions as the issuing mechanism for bond issuers. 
5.2 Further Study 
In this thesis, the first study only focuses on the revenue difference between the book 
building and uniform auctions. Under the IPO setting, under-pricing under auctions and 
book building is the main concern by most researchers. Therefore, it is worthy to study 
the difference of under-pricing under the bond market condition. In the second study, 
the revenue comparison between discriminatory auctions and uniform auctions is using 
the bond level data. Specifically, the lack of individual bids from each dealers limits me 
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